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Abstract
The central attraction of value-added tax relative to its alternatives is that it facili-
tates tax enforcement. By allowing the adjustment of tax paid on inputs, VAT reduces
a firm’s incentive and ability to evade. The mechanism makes good sense in theory
but remains largely untested empirically. This paper exploits the staggered adoption
of VAT in Pakistan, whereby it was first implemented on manufacturers and was later
extended one-by-one to the other production stages, to test the hypothesis empirically.
Using the population of VAT returns, I find robust support for the self-enforcement hy-
pothesis. Taxable sales of firms already in the tax net rise significantly as their trading
partners enter the tax regime. The tax, however, has a far weaker effect on informality.
Firms operating outside the formal regime remain almost insensitive to the deepening
penetration of VAT around them. They ultimately enter the tax net once the govern-
ment begins checking their records physically. Using the differences in response to the
upstream and downstream extension of the tax, I uncover the mechanism driving the
self-enforcement.
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I Introduction
Since 1975, the share of value added tax (VAT) in total government revenue has risen from
9% to 20% in the OECD countries. At the same time, the share of income tax has fallen
from 30% to 24% (OECD, 2017). A similar shift towards VAT is taking place in emerging
economies, where it is replacing falling revenues from international trade (Baunsgaard &
Keen, 2010; Cage & Gadenne, 2017). VAT has now been adopted by every country in the
world other than the United States and a few oil-rich countries, and its rates are increasing
steadily over time (International Tax Dialogue, 2013).1 The marked shift towards VAT has
been one of the most significant public finance developments of recent years but has been
understudied in the literature.
The principal force driving the expansion of VAT is that it is considered easier to en-
force than its alternatives. It is a simple tax on transactions, wherein the tax paid on inputs
of a firm is offset against its output tax liability. This peculiar collectionmechanismmeans
that every inter-firm transaction gets recorded at two places, creating paper trails on such
transactions. The information trails linking unrelated, arm’s length parties are argued to
facilitate tax compliance (Kopczuk & Slemrod, 2006; Pomeranz, 2015). Firms lose their
ability to conceal the transactions unilaterally and it becomes easier for the government
to trace them from the source. Furthermore, VAT’s base is broader than income tax’s. Its
assessment therefore requires fewer calculations and involves less human judgment than
the computation of profits, making the tax more transparent and hence less manipulable
(Best et al., 2015).
The self-enforcement ofVATmakes good sense in theory, but it remains largely untested
empirically. The difficulties in testing it are partly mechanical. The microdata needed to
estimate the enforcement spillovers ofVAThadnot been available to researchers until quite
recently. But some of the difficulties are also methodological. The enforcement dividend
of VAT, if it creates one, is intricately intertwined with macro shocks and secular trends
in outcomes, and the variation needed to disentangle the confounding effects has rarely
been available.
This paper combines unique variation created by the staggered introduction of VAT
in Pakistan and the availability of administrative microdata to overcome these difficulties.
Pakistan decided in principle to implement a broad-based VAT in its standard form in
1990. However, to make the new levy politically more palatable, it was not implemented
1For example, the standard rate of VAT in OECD countries has gone up on average from 11.7% on its
introduction to 18.7% now, increasing by more than 60% (see Table 1 in the International Tax Dialogue,
2013). For some of the discussion and numbers reported here, I also draw on John Kay’s column in the
Financial Times of September 1, 2017 (https://goo.gl/NLexoe)
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in one go but was staggered into phases. In its initial phase lasting until 1995,2 the tax was
applied to a narrow base consisting of a few manufacturing industries only. The base was
expanded aggressively after that, and the tax was extended to almost all manufacturers
in 1996; to importers in 1997; to distributors, wholesalers, and retailers in 1998; to the
energy sector in 1999; and to service providers in 2000. Because of these extensions, the
penetration of VAT in the country grew sharply during the period 1996-2000, increasing
by almost twenty-fold in terms of the number of firms in the tax net and almost ten-fold in
terms of the volume of transactions subject to it. I use this variation to identify the causal
impact of VAT on tax compliance, along both the intensive and extensive margins.
For this purpose, I focus on manufacturers—the firms who enter the tax net at the
earliest—and see how their outcomes respond as the tax gets extended to their buyers
and suppliers. To the extent that VAT is self-enforcing, the tax compliance of existing
manufacturers will improve as their trading partners become subject to the tax (intensive-
margin response). The increasing exposure to VAT will also push informal firms into the
formal sector as the government begins receiving information on their transactions with
registered firms and their returns from operating informally squeeze (extensive-margin
response).
One useful feature of the Pakistani setting is that I can compare these enforcement
spillovers with the effects of another experiment in which tax enforcement was tight-
ened usingmore traditional measures. Pakistan launched a countrywide survey of house-
holds and enterprises from May 2000. Inspectors from the tax administration and other
law enforcement agencies visited firms and households, gathering their financial data.
These data were reconciled with information from other sources, and tax assessments
were raised where necessary. The survey, which continued for more than twenty-four
months, arose out of political compulsions of the country at the time and was in no way
connected with the planned trajectory of VAT in the country. It however was a large en-
forcement shock in the sense thatwithin a short span of time all firms in the country—both
registered and unregistered—underwent a brief audit of their records. I estimate the ef-
fects of the survey on firm behavior and compare them to the VAT spillovers. The com-
parison allows me to put the enforcement gains from VAT into perspective to see how
significant they are.
To estimate these effects, I follow a simple event-study research design, comparing the
outcomes of manufacturers and importers over time. I focus on manufacturers because
they are the first group to enter the tax net and hence experience the maximum tax varia-
2Pakistan’s financial year begins from July. Any reference to year t in this paper refers to the financial
year from July t to June t+ 1.
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tion. They are also the most important group in terms of tax revenue, contributing more
than 90%of the domestic VAT collected in the country. I use importers as the control group
because they operate in the same markets as manufacturers and thus experience similar
macro shocks. But they are not affected by the enforcement shocks to the same degree as
manufacturers are. Importers have limited ability to evade VAT. The government observes
their purchases directly when they pass through customs stations. They, therefore, cannot
reduce their reported sales below a given level. Nor can they operate in the informal sector
as VAT registration is a mandatory prerequisite for the clearance of import consignments.
Using importers as the control group rests on the assumption that for an unchanged en-
forcement environment their outcomes would trend similarly to manufacturers’. I show
that this is indeed true for a large number of pre- and post-intervention periods and a
variety of intensive and extensive margin outcomes.
Using administrative data comprising the universe of VAT returns, I document four
key findings. First, I show that VAT is indeed self-enforcing. Taxable sales reported by
manufacturers already in the tax net rise considerably relative to importers as their expo-
sure to VAT deepens. The effect is strong (around 40 log points), precisely estimated, and
remarkably robust to a variety of specification checks. Second, VAT has a far weaker effect
on informality. The increasing penetration of VAT does accelerate the registration of in-
formal manufacturers, but the new registrants do not begin filing returns or remitting the
tax until the inspectors begin visiting them during the enforcement survey. Third, the up-
ward extension of the tax bites much more than the downward extension. The outcomes
of manufacturers begin to diverge from those of importers exactly from the time electric-
ity and gas—a production stage upstream tomanufacturers—become taxable. In contrast,
the extension of VAT to distributors, dealers, wholesalers, and retailer—production stages
downstream to manufacturers—does not produce any response at all. And finally, tra-
ditional enforcement measures are also effective against noncompliance, in particular in
bringing informal firms into the formal sector. The enforcement survey causes unregis-
tered firms to register and dormant firms to become active and begin paying the tax.
VAT encapsulates three distinct mechanisms that can give it its self-enforcing charac-
ter. It, as explained above, generates third-party information on inter-firm transactions
(Kopczuk & Slemrod, 2006). It creates asymmetric incentives between sellers and buy-
ers to cheat (Pomeranz, 2015). Specifically, underreporting by a seller hurts the buyer
who cannot claim tax credit to the full extent of inputs used by it. And lastly, VAT con-
tains a built-in withholding element to it, as the tax to the extent of inputs acquired from
the formal sector gets deducted at the upstream stage (Keen, 2008). These three mecha-
nisms, though intricately linked to each other, have features that permit their separation in
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the empirical application. Withholding works downwards, from an upstream to a down-
stream stage. Asymmetric incentives, on the other hand, act in the opposite direction, as
buyers induce sellers to report truthfully or collude. Third-party information works in
either directions. The empirical results show that the upstream extension elicits an ex-
tremely large response. In comparison, the downstream extension produces no response
at all. One can also argue that the Pakistani upstream extension—bringing electricity and
gas into the tax net—generates no new information trails. Electricity and gas in Pakistan
are primarily supplied by four large public-sector companies. Information on transactions
of these suppliers was always available to the inspectors, even in the pre-VAT periods.
Collectively, the three empirical facts suggest that withholding—higher tax collection on
inputs of a firm—drives the large self-enforcement response documented in this paper.
In the standard tax compliance models, withholding is considered neutral to a firm’s
reporting choice. The firm makes the choice trading off the benefits and costs of tax eva-
sion, and withholding does not enter the calculus unless it affects the costs of evasion
directly. I propose a simple model that explains why withholding may have a strong bite
in the nonstandard setting of VAT, where tax liability of a firm can become negative. In the
model, audit is the main instrument through which the government secures tax compli-
ance. The government, however, does not observe real activity of a firm and is therefore
constrained to make the selection of audit contingent on the limited information it gets
through the VAT return. One of the most salient cells in the return is whether the tax li-
ability of a firm exceeds zero. Negative liability, in particular for a manufacturer, signals
suppressed sales, and the government oversamples firms who go into the red frequently.
This audit rule feeds into the evasion costs faced by a firm, creating a large jump at the
point tax liability becomes zero. Withholding in this setting does affect the evasion costs.
The zero-tax-liability point shifts whenmore tax is withheld on the inputs of a firm, giving
withholding a bite it lacks in the standard setting.
The discontinuity in evasion costs will induce firms to locate just to the right of the
zero-liability point. Consistent with this prediction of the model, I find large and ex-
tremely sharp bunching of manufacturers just above the point where taxable sales equal
taxable input costs and hence tax liability becomes zero. Note that the taxable input costs
of a firm do not include labor costs and the costs of other inputs that may be exempt at
the time. The bunching therefore cannot be explained by any real phenomenon such as
market competition (zero profits), liquidity constraints, or any feature of the technology.
Nor can it be explained by the transaction costs, as firms can carry forward the balance
amount costlessly by ticking a cell on the tax return. Comparing the bunching across 1998
and 1999, the year before and after electricity and gas—two major inputs of manufactur-
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ers—become taxable, I show that firms close to the zero-liability point absorb the increase
in their input tax instead of passing it on one-for-one to the tax liability, thereby reducing
the amount they evade. These firms report higher sales to avoid falling into the negative
liability region. Higher reported sales mean that the government receives more revenue
in aggregate than earlier—an enforcement dividend of VAT.
The results in this paper have three implications that go beyond VAT. First, third-party
information is increasingly been seen in the public finance literature as the key to tax com-
pliance (Kleven et al., 2016; Kopczuk& Slemrod, 2006; Gordon&Li, 2009; Pomeranz, 2015).
This paper, however, demonstrates that the third-party information in itself does not guar-
antee truthful reporting. Firms continue to cheat and operate in the informal sector even
when their trading partners are in the VAT regime, and therefore transactions with them
are recorded. Second, the paper documents that the traditional enforcement measures
also work. In fact, they are a necessary complement of the self-enforcing mechanisms
built into the modern broad-based taxes. Recent literature casts the tax compliance prob-
lem almost entirely as an incomplete information problem, taking quite a cynical view of
these measures. This paper, however, shows that the tax survey induces numerous infor-
mal firms to formalize. It also shows that the vast majority of these firms should have been
remitting VAT. Yet, they were operating informally and the self-enforcement mechanism
of VAT did not have sufficient bite to bring them into the tax net on its own. They formal-
ized only when the physical enforcement was tightened: the inspectors visited them to
conduct their audit. Lastly, the large impact of withholding in this setup emphasizes the
importance of nonstandard models in explaining behavior in developing economies. De-
spite the theoretical result that withholding makes VAT a welfare-improving tax relative
to its alternatives in settings with large informality (Keen, 2008), the empirical results that
withholding reduces noncompliance (Brockmeyer&Hernandez, 2017), andwithholding’s
widespread use in the developing world, it is still not a part of the discourse in the public
finance literature, dismissed largely as an undesirable feature of the taxation structure of
developing economies.
The enforcement properties of VAT have been studied before. But owing mainly to the
two difficulties mentioned above, the existing evidence is largely limited to cross-country
studies (see for example Baunsgaard & Keen, 2010; Keen & Lockwood, 2010).3 There are
two notable exceptions to this. Pomeranz (2015) randomizes enforcement shock among
small firms in Chile to show that the third-party information created by VAT complements
3Another set of papers looks at the effects of the VAT exemption threshold on firm behavior in particular
on their decisions to register voluntarily and grow beyond the given size (e.g. Liu et al., 2017; Harju et al.,
2017; Asatryan & Peichl, 2017). This strand of literature, however, does not investigate the behavior of firms
already in the tax net, the subject of the current paper.
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enforcement. Tax evasion is far less extensive in firm-to-firm transactions that generate
such information than it is in firms-to-consumer transactions that do not. Somewhat re-
latedly, de Paula & Scheinkman (2010) show that VAT induces formal firms in Brazil to
trade more with formal firms, creating good compliance chains. The Pakistani setting offer
three methodological advantages that let me extend the analysis in these papers. First,
the variation created by the staggered introduction of the tax covers more than 90% of the
VAT base of the country. This permits me to examine the VAT spillovers on a much larger
scope and over a longer time horizon. Second, the setting allow me to estimate the effects
along both the informality and conditional-on-participation compliance choices of firms.
Third, the availability of both upstream and downstream extensions helps uncovering the
mechanisms underlying the self-enforcement. For these reasons, the paper represents to
my knowledge the first holistic examination of the self-enforcement hypothesis in litera-
ture. On a broader level, the paper contributes to the growing empirical literature that uses
microdata to estimate how enforcement technologies, both traditional and nontraditional,
impact reporting and participation choices of economic agents in a low taxation-capacity
setting (see for example Waseem, 2018; Naritomi, 2016; Carrillo et al., 2017; Bachas & Soto,
2017;Waseem, 2017). Relative to the existing papers, I am able here to compare the impacts
of the traditional and nontraditional technologies.
II Context
II.A Introduction and Growth of VAT in Pakistan
Likemany other developing countries, Pakistan introducedVAT in the 1990s. The country,
at the time, was facing a gradual decline in revenues from falling import tariffs, and a
broad-based consumption tax was seen as the long-term solution to bridge the fiscal gap.
The legislation to implement VAT was enacted in July 1990, but to reduce the political
costs of introducing a major new levy, its roll out was staggered into phases. Figure I
illustrates this. It plots the number of firms who file a VAT return at least once in a given
quarter, highlighting three distinct phases in the development of the tax in the country:
introduction (1990-1995), expansion (1996-2000), and steady state (2001 onward). In the
introductory phase, the new tax was applied to a very narrow base consisting of a few
manufacturing industries only. The tax was systematically expanded after that. It was
first extended to the rest of manufacturers and later one-by-one to the other stages of the
production chain. Specifically, it was extended to almost all manufacturers in 1996; to
importers in 1997; to distributors, wholesalers, and retailers in 1998; to energy suppliers
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in 1999; and to service providers in 2000. With these extensions, the number of firms in
the tax net grew sharply from around 3,500 in 1995 to 80,000 in 2000.
Figure II plots the entry of new firms into the VAT regime, disaggregating the analysis
by production stage. It shows that the sharp expansion of the tax during 1996-2000 was
largely driven by the statutory changes. The majority of firms of a given production stage
began remitting VAT immediately after their supplies became taxable. Relative to these
spikes, the macro-driven changes in entry are small. This can be seen by looking at the
post-2002 period during which the tax policy and enforcement environment remained
stable. Throughout this fairly long period, the entry of new firms continued to be flat,
exhibiting no secular trend, and the macro shocks to the process remained minimal.
The widening scope of the tax also meant that increasingly more firm transactions
came under its coverage. Figure III shows this visually. Starting from a low base, sales
and inputs covered by VAT rose steadily, with quarterly taxable sales increasing from PKR
80 billion at the start of 1996 to around 750 billion by the end of 2000.4 The increase was
particularly sharp in 1999 when the tax was extended to the energy sector, which includes
electricity, gas, and other forms of fuel.
Collectively, Figures I-III illustrate that in the short period between 1996 and 2000 the
coverage of VAT in the country expanded by almost twenty-fold in terms of the number
of firms and almost ten-fold in terms of the volume of transactions. I exploit this vari-
ation to estimate how the compliance of incumbent firms changes as their exposure to
VAT deepens, meaning more of their input and sales transactions become subject to the
self-enforcing forces created by the tax.
II.B Tax Design
During the period covered in this study, the design of VAT in the country remained quite
similar to its standard form. Firms whose supplies were not exempt were required to reg-
ister with the tax administration. Exemptions were of two types. A small-firm exemption
was available to manufacturers and retailers if their annual turnover did not exceed PKR 1
million (2.5 million from 1999 and 5 million from 2004) and 5 million respectively.5 Other
than this, a generic exemption applied to firms whose supplies fell in the negative list.
The negative list, as noted above, largely operated at the production stage level. After the
withdrawal of these exemptions in 1996-2000, the list contained only a few items such as
unprocessed food. Firms not required to register could do so voluntarily.
4One US$ was worth around fifty PKR in 1999.
5Themanufacturers and retailers below the exemption thresholdwere required to pay turnover tax under
a simplified scheme. The turnover tax was introduced in 1996 and was withdrawn in 2004.
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While registered, whether voluntarily or otherwise, firms were obliged to remit VAT
on their sales and were allowed to adjust the tax paid on their inputs. In case the adjust-
ment exceeded the tax due, they could carry forward, or obtain the refund of, the balance
amount. There were no transaction costs of claiming a carry forward as firms could do so
on their own by ticking a cell on the return form. Obtaining refunds, on the other hand,
was costly, as refunds were sanctioned only after a preaudit of the claim. A seller was
required to issue a tax invoice for each sale transaction, and the buyer could claim the tax
credit only if it possessed the invoice issued in its name. The tax was destination-based:
imports into the country were taxed at the standard rate and exports were zero-rated.
Any tax remitted on inputs used for exports was refunded. Throughout this paper, I focus
solely on the domestic taxable sales of firms, abstracting from exports. Figure A.I plots
the standard VAT rate in the country. It generally remained at 15% other than two brief
episodes during which it was first decreased to 12.5% and then increased to 18%. The
standard rate applied to domestic sales only as exports were zero-rated.
Firms were required to file a return and remit the tax due every month. The filing
was based on the principle of self-assessment and there was no preaudit contact between
taxpayers and tax collectors. The filed returns were considered final unless selected for
audit. The tax administration at the time did not have the capacity to cross-match trans-
actions electronically. Accordingly, the audit selection was largely based on the limited
information received through the single-paged return form. One of the more salient cells
on the return form was if the tax liability exceeded zero. Negative tax liability is a rare
event for taxpayers other than exporters. Going into the red frequently, in particular by a
manufacturer, was therefore one of the major triggers of audit.
II.C Enforcement Survey
I contrast the enforcement spillovers created by the expansion of VATwith the effects of an-
other experiment that tightened tax enforcement in the country through more traditional
measures. The experiment—a nationwide survey of enterprises—took place in 2000-02,
soon after VAThad been extended to all production stages. The objective of the surveywas
to document the national economy, hoping it would bring in more taxpayers and revenue.
In the original design of the survey, teams comprising officials of the tax administration
and other law enforcement agencies were to visit both registered and unregistered firms,
gathering information such as their sales, income, assets, liabilities, and inventories. The
information was to be reconciled with data from other sources, and assessment orders
were to be issued in case of discrepancies.
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Unsurprisingly, the survey was unpopular and met determined resistance from small
traders, who boycotted it immediately after its announcement on May 24, 2000. After a
protracted period of strikes, closedowns, and negotiations, the government and traders
reached an agreement on August 22, 2000. The agreement softened the survey consider-
ably, removing its most unpopular provision requiring the physical verification of inven-
tories. The revised survey was completed over the next two years.
Two facts about the survey need emphasizing. First, it arose out of political compul-
sions of the country at the time and was not connected in any way with the planned tra-
jectory of VAT in the country. Pakistan had an unanticipated change in government in
October 1999, and the surveywas one of themeasures the new government took to reduce
corruption in the country. Second, although the survey consisted of traditional enforce-
ment measures such as inspectors’ visits and audits, it was different in the sense that the
threat from these measures was credible. The government invested considerable political
stock in the exercise and took measures to ensure that there was as little corruption in this
process as possible.
III Conceptual Framework
III.A Self-Enforcement Under VAT
The central focus of this paper is to test if VAT is self-enforcing, and if so what drives this
process. Self-enforcement refers to the idea that in VAT firms in the consecutive stages of
a production chain are linked to each other through its invoice-credit mechanism, which
reduces their ability and incentive to evade the tax. To develop intuition on how this
process works, consider a firm that uses taxable inputs costing c(sj) to produce sj units of
revenue. The subscript j indexes the ordered set of production stages j ∈ 1, 2, ..., J through
which a good passes before its ultimate consumption. For simplicity, I assume for the time
being that each production stage contains only one firm. The firm reports taxable sales sˆj
and taxable input costs cˆj to the government, paying the VAT of Tj = τ(sˆj − cˆj), where τ
is the tax rate. The government does not observe real sales or costs so that the firm can
underreport sales sˆj < sj and/or overreport costs cˆj > cj on paying a resource cost of
g(sj − sˆj, cˆj − cj).
Note that the notion of self-enforcement makes sense in this second-best world only. If
the government can costlessly observe sj and cj , the enforcement problem disappears and
there is no distinction betweenVAT and its alternative consumption taxes such as the retail
sales tax. VAT is thus attractive only if the enforcement problem is nontrivial, meaning that
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the evasion costs g(sj− sˆj, cˆj−cj) are finite. Self-enforcement is in fact a statement on these
costs, asserting that they are strictly greater underVAT than the alternatives. Theoretically,
the higher evasion costs under VAT could result from one or more of the following three
mechanisms.
Third-Party Information: In VAT, each inter-firm transaction is recorded at two places,
creating a paper trail on such transactions. The trail makes one-sided evasion, where the
two reports do not match, extremely risky and two-sided evasion, where the two reports
do match, less profitable. In both cases, evasion decreases relative to the counterfactual
where the transaction is recorded at one place only. This is the mechanismmost discussed
in literature in relation to the self-enforcement of VAT (see, for example, Kopczuk & Slem-
rod, 2006; Pomeranz, 2015). In fact, the self-enforcement and third-party information have
become synonymous. But recently evidence has started to emerge that casts doubt on the
deterrence potential of third-party information in low-enforcement-capacity setting (Car-
rillo et al., 2017). Though it must be emphasized that the evidence relates to income tax
and no parallel result exists in the context of VAT.
Asymmetric Incentives: VAT makes a downstream firm a stakeholder in the tax paid at
the upstream stage, creating asymmetric incentives between sellers and buyers to cheat.
Specifically, in a firm-to-firm transaction the seller would like to under-report its sales but
doing so would hurt the buyer who would not be able to adjust tax to the full extent of
inputs used by it. In fact, if a seller under-reports sˆj < sj and the buyer cooperates so that
cˆj+1 = sˆj , the buyer would be left owing the underreported tax from the previous stage.6
This is a unique feature of VAT: truthful reporting at one stage recovers the unremitted
tax from all previous stages of the production chain. Because of this, underreporting by
an upstream firm is feasible only if it either takes the extreme risk of one-sided evasion or
shares the proceeds of evasion with the downstream firm. Note that the mechanism does
not work at the final stage, as end consumers cannot claim the tax back.
Tax Withholding: One important feature of VAT that often gets overlooked is that it also
embeds a withholding mechanism into it. Consider for example a formal firm in stage
j that sells intermediates valuing sj to a downstream firm. The seller will remit VAT
amounting to τsj on the transaction, and the buyer can credit the tax if it is registered.
The tax remitted at the upstream stage thus functions as a withholding tax if the down-
6In this particular example, the buyer—assuming that it reports truthfully—will pay τ(sj+1− sˆj) in place
of τ(sj+1− sj) if it goes along with the underreporting of seller, matching its input purchases with the sales
reported by the seller i.e. cˆj+1 = sˆj . Thus, it will pay τ(sj − sˆj) over and above its true tax liability, which
exactly equals the tax evaded by the seller at the upstream stage.
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stream firm is formal and as an input tax if it is not (see Keen, 2008 for the theoretical
implications of this mechanism). Note that in the first-best setting such withholding has
no effect on behavior; it only means that the tax is collected at two rather than one stage.
But in a setting where evasion is feasible, withholding can have a large effect, especially if
the upstream stage is more formal. Withholding in this case creates a floor the reported
sales of the downstream firm cannot cross without triggering a significant jump in the au-
dit probability. As I noted in section II.B, when a firm’s input tax adjustment exceeds the
tax due on output, it opts for either the refund or carry forward of the balance amount.
Both cases raise a flag with the tax administration if the firm is not an exporter, raising its
likelihood of facing an audit discretely. The discontinuity in the audit probability at zero
tax liability can compel firms to stay in the black, giving withholding a bite it lacks in the
standard setting. I explain this mechanism in greater details in section V of the paper.
The above threemechanisms, though intricately linked to each other, have features that
permit their separation in the empirical application. The withholding mechanism works
downwards, from an upstream to a downstream stage. Asymmetric incentives, on the
other hand, act in the opposite direction, as buyers induce sellers to remit tax or collude.
Third-party information works in either direction. In the Pakistani setting, VAT was first
introduced on manufacturers and was later extended to the other production stages, one
after the other. If we focus on manufacturers only, the impacts of the three mechanisms
can be disentangled using their differential responses to the upstream and downstream
extensions of VAT.
How important is it to differentiate the three mechanisms? Note that while VAT has
a few standard features, its design can always be tweaked to strengthen a given mech-
anism. For example, if withholding deters noncompliance the most, tax rate at the up-
stream stages can be raised to make the effect stronger. In fact, many countries impose
a higher tax rate and/or deploy additional withholding on imported raw materials for
this purpose (see Table 1 in Keen, 2008 for details). Similarly, the absence of the other two
mechanisms in firm-to-consumer transactions makes the retail stage a particularly vulner-
able point for VAT. The tax can potentially unravel from this point if the two mechanisms
are the principal drivers of compliance. This has led a few countries, including Argentina,
Bolivia, China, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Italy, Portugal, Puerto Rico, South Korea and
Slovakia, to introduce schemes that create incentives among consumers to obtain receipts
of their purchases and report them to the authorities (Naritomi, 2016).
The above framework applies regardless of whether noncompliance occurs along the
intensive or extensive margin. The double-recording of transactions, tax withholding by
sellers, and push from buyers for correct payments make evasion by a registered firm
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harder (intensive margin). These forces make operating without registration difficult, too
(extensive margin). Information concerning sales to, and purchases from, an unregistered
firm exposes the firm to a greater risk of getting caught. Withholding reduces tax savings
from operating informally. And an informal firm can lose customers if it cannot issue tax
invoices. To the extent that these mechanisms work, the expansion of VAT over time will
push informal firms into formality in the same way it will push registered firms to greater
tax compliance.
III.B Empirical Strategy
The principal econometric challenge in estimating the enforcement effects of VAT is to dis-
tinguish them from contemporaneous macro shocks. To see this formally, let i index firms
and t units of time. Reported taxable sales of a firm sˆit are potentially a nonlinear func-
tion of tax rate τt, firm characteristicsX it, demand and supply shocks λt, and government
policy θ
(1) sˆit = f(τt,X it, λt; θ).
The dependence of the outcome on the policy regime θ captures the intuition developed
above that the cost of misreporting varies with the enforcement regime chosen by the gov-
ernment, which includes inter alia the design and coverage of VAT at time t. Suppose that
in period t′ the regime changes from θ to θ′ . In the Pakistani context, it could mean either
extending VAT to a hitherto untaxed production stage—making more inter-firm transac-
tions subject to the tax—or tightening the enforcement directly through the tax survey. Us-
ing the terminology of the Neyman-Rubin-Holland potential outcomes framework, the ef-
fect of the policy change can be expressed as ∆it′ = sˆit′(τt′ ,X it′ , λt′ ; θ′)− sˆit′(τt′ ,X it′ , λt′ ; θ).
Because the second term in this expression—counterfactual sales—is not observed, the ef-
fect cannot be estimated without making some assumptions. The first assumption I make
is the following
Assumption 1: The functional form of reported sales is log-linear, and the effect of the policy is
additive in percentage terms.
Under this assumption, equation (1) can be written in its estimating form as
(2) log sˆit = αi + β .1(t > t′) + X˜
′
itγ + λ˜t + εit,
where X˜it now contains the time-varying covariates only and λ˜t absorbs the tax rate.The
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parameter of interest in this equation β is not identified, being indistinguishable from
the shocks λ˜t. To get around this problem, I follow the standard difference-in-differences
methodology, comparing the outcome across manufacturers and importers.
I focus on manufacturers for two reasons. First, they are the first group to enter the tax
net and therefore experience the maximum tax variation. Over time, a production stage
immediately upstream to them—the energy sector—and production stages downstream
to them—distributors, dealers, wholesalers, and retailers—switch from being exempt to
taxable. Focusing on them therefore allowsme to utilize all the post-1996 variation. It also
lets me see if the effects of down and upstream extensions differ from each other. I use
this evidence to understand the mechanisms underlying the self-enforcement. Second,
manufacturers are also the most important group in terms of tax revenue, contributing
roughly 90% of the domestic VAT collected in the country each year. Their responses are
therefore the most consequential in term of both revenue and welfare.
I use importers as the control group. They operate in the samemarkets as manufactur-
ers and therefore are exposed to similar demand shocks. Importantly, however, they are
not affected by the enforcement shocks to the same degree manufacturers are. Importers
have limited ability to evade VAT. Their purchases are directly observed by the govern-
ment when they pass through the customs station.7 Their reported sales therefore cannot
fall below a minimum level without inviting attention of the tax authority. Nor can they
operate in the informal sector, as registration with VAT is a necessary prerequisite for im-
ports. Their tax compliance is therefore almost perfect along the extensive margin and
must be high along the intensive margin. Importers are also the uppermost production
stage. For this reason, they are largely insulated from VAT shocks, as the shocks can prop-
agate from the downstream side only. Note that the empirical strategy does not assume
that importers are immune from the enforcement shocks, but rather that their exposure to
the shocks is much less intense relative to manufacturers. In this sense, any relative dif-
ference in the two groups’ reactions to the deepening penetration of VAT or enforcement
survey will represent a lower bound on the response of manufacturers.
Thus, to the extent that the following assumption
7Of course, importers can misreport their purchases to customs authorities. Doing so, however, is much
more difficult relative to a domestic transaction. Importers pay their foreign suppliers through a letter of
credit, which gets two banks—one each in the domestic and foreign country—involved in each transaction.
The value of imported goods is also reported to the shipping and insurance companies. If an importer
decides to underinvoice imports, it has to make the balance payment to the supplier in foreign exchange
through a nonbanking channel. It also has to forge the invoice and shipping/insurance documents. Finally,
it has to convince customs authorities of the genuineness of the reported value. It is particularly costly in
Pakistan where all import consignments are preaudited—verifying both the quantity and value of goods.
None of such issues occurs in a domestic transaction.
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Assumption 2: Conditional on controls, the reported taxable sales of manufacturers i ∈ M and
importers i ∈ I on average follow the same time path as long as the enforcement regime chosen by
the government remains unchanged
(3) E
[
sˆit(θ | αi, X˜ it; i ∈M)
]
= E
[
sˆit(θ | αi, X˜ it; i ∈ I)
]
,
is satisfied, β3 in the following regression captures the causal effects of the policy change
on manufacturers
(4) log sˆit = αi + β1.1(i ∈M) + β2.1(t > t′) + β3.1(i ∈M).1(t > t′) + X˜ ′itγ + λ˜t + εit.
I offer two pieces of evidence to support the assumption. First, I estimate placebo spec-
ifications corresponding to Equation (4), establishing that the difference in outcomes be-
tween the two groups remains statistically insignificant for a large number of pre- and
post-intervention periods during which the policy environment remains stable. Second,
I always complement the regression-based analysis with nonparametric event studies. A
typical event study takes the following form
(5) log sˆit = α
′
i +
r=T∑
r=1
λ
′
r + ε
′
it.
The key objects of interest in this equation are the λ′r’s. These coefficients denote the log-
change in outcome in period r relative to the first period (r = 0) once the firm fixed ef-
fects have been partialled out. I run these regressions separately for the two groups and
plot the coefficients over a long time horizon, indicating the times from which the pol-
icy changes take effect. These event study charts permit transparent, visual assessment of
the identification assumptions underlying equation (4) and the impacts produced by the
policy changes. All specifications I estimate, whether the nonparametric event study or
the difference-in-differences model, allow unrestricted variance-covariance structure over
time at the firm level.8
III.C Data
The data for this project comprise the universe of VAT returns filed in Pakistan. I focus
principally on the period 1997-2003 but extend the analysis to other periods for robustness
8Bertrand et al. (2004) show that this technique works well when the number of entities in the panel are
large, which is the case in my empirical application.
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checks. The VAT return consists of three main sections. In the first section, firms report
the aggregate value of their sales, breaking it down into three—domestic taxable, domes-
tic exempt, and exports—components. In the second section, the aggregate value of inputs
purchased are reported, divided likewise into the three components. In the final section,
firms calculate their tax liability, indicating the tax charged on sales, the tax credited on
inputs, and the final tax payable. They select one of the two options—carry forward or
refund—in case the tax payable is negative. Each firm is assigned a unique VAT registra-
tion number and is expected to file every tax period (month). The data, therefore, have a
panel structure. In addition to the return data, I use information on firm characteristics
from the tax register. This information includes the 4-digit industry, date of registration,
production stage, and geographic location of the firm.
The production stage and 4-digit industry together form the 2-tier system the tax ad-
ministration uses to classify firms. The broader tier classifies firms into eight categories:
manufacturers, importers, exporters, wholesaler, dealers, distributors, retailers, and ser-
vice providers. Firms may undertake more than one of these activities, in which case the
data indicate both the principal and secondary activities. Manufacturers sell goods dis-
tinct from their inputs. The other categories sell same-state goods or provide services.
The broader classification of a firm corresponds to its position in the supply chain. Im-
porters are the first stage in the chain, followed by manufacturers, distributors, dealers,
wholesaler, and retailers. The scheme pins down whether a given firm is upstream or
downstream to another. The tax variation exploited in this paper is largely at this broader
level, as VAT was extended by one production stage at a time. There is one notable ex-
ception to this. Utility and energy companies are classified as manufacturer but remained
exempt until 1999. The second tier classifies firms on the basis of goods or services they
supply, using the 4-digit Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS
Code).9 This system characterizes the industry within a given production stage a firm
operates in. For example, I observe whether a given manufacturer is a supplier of energy.
III.D Key Outcomes
My two primary outcomes of interest are the number of firms in the VAT net and taxable
sales reported by them. Under the assumption of no one-sided evasion, an increase in tax-
able sales caused by a policy change is a sufficient condition that the government receives
more revenue after the change. To see this formally, consider a production stage j (manu-
9 This system is commonly used by customs administrations around the world to classify traded goods
and services.
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facturing in my empirical application). VAT revenue remitted by all production stages up
to and including j is given by
(6) T = τ sˆ1 + · · ·+ τ(sˆj−1 − cˆj−1) + τ(sˆj − cˆj),
which equals T = τ sˆj if we can rule out one-sided evasion meaning that cˆj = sˆj−1 and so
on. I will show later that one-sided evasion can safely be ruled out in my setting so that
higher sales reported at the jth stage implies that more VAT is collected from stages j and
upwards.
Note that I cannot use VAT revenue or input costs to measure the causal effects of VAT
expansion. As VAT coverage expands, these outcomes change due to bothmechanical and
behavioral reasons. For example, after an upstreamextension downstreamfirms remit less
revenue for the pure mechanical reason that their input tax credit goes up. Looking at the
input costs is even more problematic. As I mention above, firms in my data report input
costs in four cells: (i) domestic taxable inputs, (ii) domestic exempt inputs, (iii) imports,
and (iv) total inputs. When a production stage switches from being exempt to taxable,
firms in the next stage begin reporting inputs acquired from the hitherto exempt stage
in the first rather than the second cell. The evolution of the two cells will therefore be
contaminated by these mechanical effects. Even more crucially, when an input becomes
taxable the incentive to record and report it accurately increases discretely. It means that
the evolution of total input costs, although free from any mechanical effect, will conflate
behavioral responses arising from VAT expansion and lazy reporting. The evolution of
reported sales, on the other hand, provides a clean measure of the effect of interest. I
focus solely on firms whose sales remain taxable throughout the sample period so that
any change in the outcome can only reflect a behavioral response to a policy change. The
causal effects of a policy change in this paper are accordinglymeasured along the intensive
margin as the increase in reported sales it induces and along the extensive margin as the
number of informal firms it pushes into the formal sector.
Table I presents the descriptive statistics of these two outcome variables at three points
in time, stratifying the sample by production stage.10 Between 1997 and 2003, the num-
ber of firm-month observations grows by 70% for manufacturers and 271% for importer
(columns 1-3). The growth largely results from the entry of new firms, although some of
it may reflect that filing becomes more regular with time. To address any selection issues
arising from this, I create two other samples that shut down entry and exit. The first of
these (Balanced Panel 1) consists of firms who file a return at least once in every quarter
10For space considerations, I collapse sectors other than manufacturing and imports into the “other” cat-
egory.
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included in the sample (columns 4-6). These firms remain active throughout the sample
period, although they may not file in every tax period. The second restricted sample (Bal-
ance Panel 2) has amore stringent criterion. It consists of firmswho file the return in every
tax period included in the sample (columns 7-9). Note that the later two samples mitigate
the selection issues arising from the changing composition of the sample, but may create
external validity concerns as they contain regular taxpayers only. Empirically, I always
obtain similar results from the three samples, alleviating both the internal and external
validity concerns.
One other important feature of the data is that the distribution of reported sales is quite
skewed: the mean is generally larger than the 75th percentile. To ensure that the results
are not driven by few large firms, I also estimate specifications where I drop firms larger
than a given size threshold.
III.E VAT Expansion and the Real Economy
I have abstracted so far from any effects the staggered implementation of VATmay have on
output produced by firms. Note that VAT does not distort input prices faced by registered
firms. Its partial implementation, therefore, does not create production inefficiency in the
registered sector. It, however, could distort production in the unregistered sector. It could
also distort consumption. I discuss below how these distortions can influence the two
outcomes of interest, conflating the real and compliance effects produced by the policy
changes.
Demand-side effects.—Imposition of VAT on a commodity increases its consumer price rel-
ative to the others, creating the following three effects: (i) own-price substitution effect; (ii)
cross-price effects; and (iii) income effect. Of these, the first is entirely absent in my set-
ting as I focus solely on commodities that remain taxable throughout the sample period.
The Pakistani VAT extensions, as noted above, operate at the broadly-defined commodity-
group level: they bring all substitutes into the tax net together.11 For this reason, we can
also rule out the cross-price effects on substitutes. We, however, cannot rule out the other
demand-side effects. For example, the VAT extension to the energy sector may depress
the demand of all goods in general (income effect) and complements of energy in partic-
ular (cross-price effect). These two effects work in opposite direction to the enforcement
spillovers and will make finding the spillovers harder.
Supply-side effects.—Expansion of VAT can boost formal sector production through the in-
11For example, the 1999 extension brought all energy inputs—including electricity, gas, and petroleum
products—into the tax net at the same time.
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put prices channel in three ways. First, informal firms cannot claim credit of the tax re-
mitted on their inputs. VAT, thus, induces such firms to substitute toward untaxed inputs.
Inefficient production in the informal sector can spur the registered sector if the goods pro-
duced by the two are close substitutes. Second, if the supply chain of an intermediate used
by the formal sector is incomplete, the VAT remitted at the upstream stages gets loaded
into the price of the intermediate. The expansion of VAT, to the extent that it completes
the broken chains, can reduce the price of such intermediates, making formal manufac-
turing more efficient. Third, a downward extension of VAT to a hitherto untaxed stage
improves production efficiency in the stage, stimulating the demand of good supplied by
the upstream stage.
I take two measures to establish that my results represent compliance and not real
responses. First, I conduct subgroup analysis at the industry level. To the extent that the
demand and supply elasticities, and other factors such as the degree of competition from
the informal sector, vary across industries, uniform industry-level response will rule out
large real-side effects. Second, I also estimate the impact of VAT extensions on the entry of
firms in the already-taxed industries. If supply-side factors stimulate production in these
industries, the impact would also show up in the entry series.
IV Is VAT Self-Enforcing?
In this section, I first estimate the impacts of the two enforcement shocks—widening expo-
sure to VAT and tax survey—on firm outcomes. I then compare the two sets of responses
to examine if VAT creates positive enforcement spillovers and, if so, how large they are.
IV.A Taxable Sales Response
Nonparametric Event Study.—Figure IV plots the results from equation (5). I estimate the
equation on the period July-1997 to June-2003, dropping the dummy for July 1997. The
regression is run separately for manufacturers and importers, and the coefficients λ′r’s are
plotted in Panel A. Each coefficient in the plot shows the average log change in domestic
taxable sales from July 1997 to the period, once the firm fixed effects have been partialled
out. The bottom panel displays a difference-in-differences version of the plot, assessing
the statistical significance of the relative difference between the two groups in the period.
I begin the analysis from July 1997. Before that, importers were not required to remit
VAT on their sales. Between 1997 and 2003 four events occur that might impact the re-
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ported sales of manufacturers: VAT gets extended to dealers, distributors, wholesalers,
and retailers in July 1998; to energy suppliers in July 1999; and to service providers in
July 2000; and the tax survey begins from May 2000. I demarcate these events in the di-
agram by broken vertical lines. I terminate the analysis on June 2003, although in one of
the robustness checks I extend it to further periods.
It is important to emphasize that the supplies of firms depicted in this figure remained
taxable throughout the period 1997-2003. Any change in the reported sales would there-
fore reflect a behavioral response to the four eventsmentioned above and not amechanical
change arising, for example, from the extension or withdrawal of VAT to an industry.
Four facts stand out from these plots. First, the outcome trends similarly in the two
groups during the periods of no policy change. The DD coefficient remains statistically
insignificant in all the twelve periods between July 1997 and June 1998, the time during
which no change to the enforcement environment takes place. Second, the extension of
VAT to the downstream stages elicits almost no response. The relative difference between
the two groups continues on the preexisting trend in 1998-99, hovering around zero and
remaining indistinguishable from it in nine out of the twelve periods. Third, the outcomes
of manufacturers and importers begin to diverge immediately after the energy sector en-
ters the VAT net. Not only does the DD coefficient become positive and statistically signif-
icant, it starts growing in magnitude with time, reaching 32 log points by May 2000. And
finally, the two trends continue to drift apart as the final two events occur, stabilizing only
after the survey gets closer to its conclusion in 2002-03.
The nonparametric evidence thus suggests that the entry of the energy sector creates
significant enforcement spillovers on the downstream side. That the impact manifests
itself as a trend rather than a one-time increase in level suggests that withholding is the
dominant mechanism driving the response.12 I explore the mechanisms underlying the
response in detail in section V of the paper. The final two events of interest are too close to
each other, and one important challenge in the subsequent empirical analysis is to separate
the causal contribution of each in the post-2000 response.
Difference-in-Differences Results.—Table II reports the results from estimating equation (4).
The outcome variable here is the log of domestic taxable sales, and I collapse, for the
time being, the last three events into one, denoting the period after June 1999 by the Post
dummy. I show results for the complete and two balanced panel samples separately (see
12Withwithholding, the responsewill occur in a series of reinforcing steps. Therewill be an initial impact:
as more inputs of manufacturers become taxable they will report higher sales to avoid falling in the negative
tax liability region. This increase in sales will cause a further increase in taxable inputs as manufacturers
also trade between themselves, triggering a second wave of response. This reinforcing loop will continue
until we reach the new steady state.
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section III.C). Panel B conducts a placebo analysis. The placebo specification is an exact
replica of the baseline specification. I estimate equation (4) on the next seven years 2004-
2010, defining the period after June 2006 as the Post period.
Unsurprisingly, the results are in line with the nonparametric event study. The coeffi-
cient on the interaction termmanuf × 1998 is weak and insignificant, demonstrating that
bringing distributors and other downstream stages into the VAT net does not generate an
enforcement dividendup the production chain. In contrast, the coefficient onmanuf×post
is both strong and significant, capturing on average a larger than 40 log point growth in the
sales ofmanufacturers relative to importers after June 1999. The placebo exercise validates
the empirical strategy. In combination with the graphical evidence above, it confirms that
absent any policy changes the outcome indeed evolves similarly in the two groups in a
large number of pre- and post-intervention periods. Lastly, the results from the three al-
ternative samples are almost identical, putting to rest any concerns from selective entry
into or exit from the complete panel sample.
Table III explores the dynamics of the response. I now focus solely on the complete
panel sample andpartition themanuf×postdummy into two. The new termmanuf×year
captures the additional sales response in the given year. The sales of manufacturers con-
tinue to outgrow those of importers at an almost steady pace until the end of 2003. After
that, the two growth rates become indistinguishable as they were initially in the period
1997-1999. The dynamic analysis reinforces the conclusion that the changes in enforce-
ment environment cause a substantial expansion of the tax base during 1999-2003. But it
does not fully reveal the forces driving the expansion. Nor does it help disentangling the
influence of the last two events. I postpone the discussion of these questions until after I
have reported the extension margin results.
Robustness.—The principal concern with the above results is that they might be driven by
demand and supply shocks coincidentwith the events of interest that affectmanufacturers
differently than importers. While similar evolution of the treatment and control outcomes
during the times of no policy change mitigates this concern, I alleviate it further by rerun-
ning the above regressions separately for each industry. To the extent that macro shocks
affect different industries differently, disaggregating the response by industry can rule out
the concern. It can also help us decide the real vs. compliance nature of the response, as
discussed in section III.E.
FigureVperforms this exercise. I estimate equation (4) restricting the sample to firms of
one industry only. Panel A plots theManuf×Post coefficient and 95% confidence interval
around it from these regressions, comparing it against the baseline coefficient of 0.48 (see
column (1) of Table II). Panel B and C replicates the exercise, showing theManuf × 1998
21
and placebo coefficients respectively. The industry classifications used here comes from
the 2-digit aggregation scheme of the HS Code. The scheme along with the description of
the industries is shown in Table A.I.
The response is quite homogeneous across industries. The coefficient of interest is
positive and significant in all but two instances, and the 95% confidence interval around it
contains the baseline coefficient for all but four industries. In contrast, theManuf × 1998
and placebo coefficients are almost always trivial and insignificant. The sub-group analy-
sis, thus, effectively rules out the alternative, macro-based explanation of the observed
response. It also suggests that the response predominantly reflects compliance rather
than real effects. But perhaps more importantly, it shows that the weaker-than-average
response occurs in largely labor-intensive industries that were not exposed to the expand-
ing VAT around them to the same degree as others were. Table A.II illustrates this. It
investigates the characteristics of firms in the four industries—wood products; footwear;
arms and ammunition; and furniture, where the response is significantly weaker than the
average. Firms in these industries are on average smaller, employ less capital, have lower
input to output ratios, and are much less likely to register voluntarily. They are thus the
least likely to be affected by the expansion of VAT, in particular to its extension to inputs
such as electricity and gas.
Tables IV and A.III-A.IV address two further sets of concerns. The first two of these
demonstrate that the results are not driven by large firms. I restrict focus to Balanced Panel
1 and replicate the analysis in Table II, after dropping firms greater than a given cutoff. I
use predetermined firm size, dropping firms on the basis of turnover in 1997-1998 in Table
IV and 1997 only in Table A.III. The results from these restricted samples are similar to the
baseline results. Some firms in the treatment and control groups operate in more than
one stages. For instance, some of the manufacturers may combine their principal activity
with a secondary activity such as distribution or retail. Forces created by the expansion
of VAT may not act on these multistage firms in the same way they do on single-stage
firms. Table A.IV alleviates this concern. I replicate Table II after reducing the sample
to firms who operate in only one sector—manufacture or import—throughout the period
1997-2003. Reassuringly, there is no meaningful difference between the two set of results.
Finally, Tables A.VII and A.VIII show results from equation (4) after including a full
set of industry, tax office, period, industry × period, and tax office × period fixed effects.
These specifications allow firms in each industry and tax office to have a separate time
trend. Again, results are very similar to ones from the baseline specification.
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IV.B Participation Response
Does the tightening of enforcement—caused indirectly by the increasing penetration of
VATanddirectly by the tax survey—push informal firms into the formal sector? I now turn
to this question, comparing the entry of newmanufacturers and importers into the tax net
over time. The entry of importers, as I explained above, is driven entirely by macro forces
and cannot respond to the enforcement shocks.13 To the extent that the two groups of firms
experience similarmacro forces, the difference in entry isolates the impact of enforcement.
Graphical Evidence.—Figure VI presents this analysis. The entry of a firm can be defined to
occur at three different points in time: (i) when the firm registers, (ii) when it files its first
return, and (iii) when it files its first positive-activity return.14 The LHS panels plot the
raw data of these three outcomes, while the RHS panels show the corresponding plot in
the difference-in-differences format. The domestic supplies of importers become taxable
from July 1997. Due to this, their entry remains noisier than usual in the next few periods,
stabilizing only around the end of the tax year (see Figure II-C). I, accordingly, begin the
analysis from July 1998.
Importers, clearly, provide a good counterfactual for manufacturers. For a long period
during which the enforcement environment remains stable 2002-05, the three outcomes of
manufacturers and importers evolve indistinguishably from each other. The other striking
feature of the plots is that the entry of new manufacturers spikes dramatically in June
2000, jumping roughly eight-fold from an average of around 250 to more than 2,000 (see
Panel C). This large jump is caused either by the tax survey, which begins fromMay 2000,
or by the extension of VAT to service-providers, which takes effect from July 2000, and I
disentangle the two effects below. In distinction to the large influx of new manufacturers
after June 2000, bringing the energy sector under VAT in 1999 produces only a modest
effect. It clearly pushes more manufacturers to register (Panel A) but has little or no effect
on their decision to file a VAT return, positive-activity or otherwise (Panels B and C). In
fact, comparing the three outcomes between 1999 and 2002 reveals a peculiar sequence
of the response: firms who register in 1999 do not begin filing until June 2000, and they
become active even later.
To see what triggers the sudden and sharp entry of manufacturers into the formal
regime, I zoom in on the period around July 2000. Figure VII shows the weekly regis-
tration of new firms between April and December of 2000, comparing manufacturers to
13An importer cannot operate without VAT registration, as it needs to produce the registration certificate
before getting the delivery of its import consignment from the customs station.
14I define positive-activity return as a return in which at least one of the cells showing sales or purchases
made by the firm during the tax period is nonzero.
23
both importers and service providers. Vertical lines in the plots denote four important
events during this period: the government announces the tax survey on May 24 and the
extension of VAT to services on June 17; the extension takes effect on July 1; and the traders
end their resistance to the survey on August 21. The registration of new manufacturers
accelerates at the time the survey is announced, gaining momentum from early July as the
survey gets underway. It loses steam as resistance to the survey strengthens, but regains
pace again when the resistance ends. These movements are largely mirrored in the time
series of services. But, importantly, the entry of service-providers lags that of manufactur-
ers and therefore cannot have caused it. In fact, very few service-providers register when
their supplies become taxable. The subsequent surge in their arrival, especially the peak
after August 21, demonstrates that their own entry in large part results from the survey
and is not voluntary.
Regression Results.—Table V formalizes the above analysis. Using importers as counterfac-
tual, I estimate how many manufacturers move from informality into the VAT regime in
response to the enforcement shocks. Columns (4), (7), and (10) of the table report this
number for the three definitions of entry. I obtain the standard error on the number
using a nonparametric bootstrap procedure explained in greater detail below the table.
The results show that eliminating the exemption on electricity, gas, and other energy in-
puts causes more manufacturers to register (columns 2-4). The registration is around 58%
higher in 1999 than it would have been in the counterfactual world. However, the majority
of new registrants do not begin filing their returns in 1999 (columns 3-10). The enforce-
ment survey, on the other hand, leads to both more registration and filing. Registration
grows by 83%, filing by 144%, and positive-activity filing by 270% in 2000. Registration
and filing continue to be significantly higher than the counterfactual as the survey pro-
gresses.
The above results, although unequivocal in highlighting a large shift towards the for-
mal sector in 1999-2003, need further probe along two dimensions. The post-99 entrants
potentially include firms who were not legally obliged to register at the time of their entry
and did so only out of fear of the survey. Their entry is an undesirable byproduct of the
survey and needs to be separated. Figures VIII and IX do this. Figure VIII compares the
first-year turnover of firms by their entry period.15 While doing this exercise, I drop the
firms whose first-year turnover exceeds PKR 1 billion. These are excessively large firms,
15The first year here is defined as the tax year immediately succeeding the one inwhich the firmfiles it first
VAT return. For example, if a firm files it first return in August 2000, its first-year turnover is the aggregate
value of its sales in the tax year 2001-02.
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whose exclusion reduces noise in the plots without altering the message.16 Panel B of the
figure looks at the same question using another metric. It illustrates the proportion of
firms whose first-year turnover is above the exemption cutoff.17 Clearly, the 2000-2001 en-
trants are on average smaller than the 1999-2000 entrants. The proportion of firm above
the exemption cutoff also drops at the time the survey kicks in, but the drop is less pro-
nounced, and recovers quicker, than the decline in the average turnover.
If the firms who enter after 2000 do so solely out of the fear of physical enforcement,
they are expected to drop out once the threat ceases. To test this, Figure IX plots the long-
term survival probability of firms by their entry period. The post-2000 entrants are less
likely to last the next eight to ten years in the tax net, but this effect is noticeable for the ini-
tial few periods only. Survival likelihood then becomes indistinguishable from the trend.
Figures A.II-A.III replicate this analysis, defining entry as the period in which a firm reg-
isters. The results are comparable. Overall, the evidence thus suggests that the survey
indeed pushes few not-liable-to-register firms into the tax net. But this effect is generally
small, and accordingly the extensive margin response to the survey in large part repre-
sents the firms who should have been in the tax net but would not have done so without
the government intervention.
One other result in Table V needs mentioning. The filing response to the survey is sig-
nificantly larger than the registration response in its first year (compare column 4, 7 and
10 in the second row). The difference suggests a buildup of registered firms inside the
VAT net as its coverage deepens. These firms register but do not begin remitting the tax
until the government takes more intrusive and direct enforcement measures. The behav-
ior suggests a model wherein firms (a) derive benefit from VAT registration independent
of filing and (b) face fixed adjustment costs or other frictions in moving from registration
to filing that they cannot overcome without an extraneous force. On a broader level, the
results therefore demonstrate that physical- and self-enforcement are complements, and
that self-enforcement on its own is insufficient to compel informal firms into full compli-
ance.
V Mechanism Underlying Self-enforcement
I have documented above that the extension of VAT to the downstream stages causes no
significant change in the reported sales of manufacturers. Note that the downstream ex-
16Their inclusion creates large spikes in the outcome variable for the periods during which one or more
of such large firms enter. These spikes do not affect the trend, which is the matter of interest here.
17Note that the exemption cutoff applies only to manufacturers. I use the same cutoff for importers.
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tension brings the first two self-enforcing mechanisms of VAT into play: the third-party
information available to the government increases and the buyers become stake holders
in the tax paid at the upstream stage after the extension. The reform however has no with-
holding element to it, as the tax extends to a downstream stage.
I have also documented that bringing the energy sector into the tax net causes a large
increase in the reported sales of manufacturers. In distinction to the above, this reform has
a large withholding element to it. Energy is a major input to the manufacturing process,
and once it becomes taxable a significant proportion of VAT payable by manufacturers
gets withheld at the upstream stage. It can also be argued that the reform creates no new
information trails. Energy in Pakistan is predominantly supplied by a few large suppliers,
the majority of whom are in public ownership.18 The information on sales transactions
of these companies were always accessible to the government and it is hard to argue that
the information flows increased significantly after the reform.19 The evidence thus sug-
gests that withholding is the likely mechanism driving the self-enforcing impact of VAT
documented above.
In the standard tax compliance model, a firm makes its reporting decision trading off
the costs of evasion with its benefits, and it is not clear a priori how withholding would
affect this calculus. In this section, I first propose a simple model that shows how with-
holding may have a large bite in settings similar to Pakistan’s. I then provide additional
evidence that (a) confirms the predictions of the model and (b) shows that withholding
could indeed be the mechanism driving the observed responses.
V.A Setup
A continuum of manufacturing firms of measure one is indexed by i ∈ I . Each firm is
characterized by a two-dimensional vector φ = {φr, φe} determining its ability to produce
real output and evade taxes. A firm i combines taxable inputs costing c(si;φ) and non-
taxable inputs costing ψ(si;φ) to produce si units of output that can be sold at a fixed
price, normalized to one. The government implements the standard VAT, whereby the
firm is required to charge the tax at a rate τ of its output and is allowed to deduct the tax
paid on inputs. The government’s ability to observe output is limited and the firm can
underreport its sales sˆi < si on paying a resource cost of g(si − sˆi;φ). VAT can be evaded
18For example, electricity and gas, which constitute the major component of the energy sector, are almost
entirely supplied by four public sector companies.
19In fact, the legislation requires taxpayers to maintain their electricity and gas bills and make them avail-
able during the time of audit. Thus, even before the extension of VAT to the energy sector, the information
on input transactions with the sector was available to the government.
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by underreporting sales and/or overreporting costs. Here I abstract from costs overre-
porting to keep the exposition simple, assuming that taxable inputs are acquired from the
organized sector and their misreporting is therefore not feasible. The firm’s profit in this
setting (compressing some notation) are given by
(7) pi(si, sˆi;φ) = si − ci − ψi + τsi︸︷︷︸
output tax
− τci︸︷︷︸
input tax
− τ (sˆi−c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax remitted
− g (si−sˆi;φ)︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
evasion costs
The above expression implicitly assumes that the firm recovers VAT from its buyers on all
its sales si but remits only τ (sˆi − ci) to the government. The evaded sales (si − sˆi) thus
should be seen as sales made to the unregistered sector, where buyers have no incentive
to obtain the VAT invoice so that the firm can appropriate all the surplus from tax evasion
to itself.20 Equation (7) can be written more compactly as
(8) pi(si, sˆi;φ) = si − ci − ψi + τ (si−sˆi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax evasion
− g (si−sˆi;φ)︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
evasion costs
I assume here that the evasion costs g(si − sˆi;φ) are a function of the evaded amount
only and do not depend on the real output produced by the firm (the two elements of
productivity φr and φe are independent of each other). The separability between evasion
and production costs along with the fact that VAT does not distort input prices allows me
to focus solely on the tax compliance decision of the firm, abstracting from real decisions
such as substitution between taxable and nontaxable inputs. One distinguishing feature
of VAT is that in it a firm’s tax liability can become negative if the input tax τci exceeds
the reported output tax τ sˆi. I assume that the costs of evasion faced by the firm are of the
following form
(9) g(si − sˆi;φ) =
γ(si − sˆi;φ) if sˆi > ciαγ(si − sˆi;φ) if sˆi ≤ ci,
where γ(.) is an increasing and convex function of the evaded amount (si − sˆi) and α > 1,
which means that the costs jump at the point tax liability becomes negative. The jump
reflects the intuition that the likelihood of a firm facing an audit rises discretely as its
reported sales fall below the taxable inputs costs. It is because the firm opts for either the
20Note that this assumption is for notational economy only and can be relaxed easily. In a general model
where the seller and buyer bargain over the evasion surplus, everything here goes through other than that
the benefit of evasion to the seller is στ(si − sˆi) rather than τ (si − sˆi), where σ is the seller’s bargaining
weight. We are effectively assuming here that σ = 1, so that the buyer receives no surplus from evasion.
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refund or carry forward of the balance amount τ(sˆi−ci)when this happens, and both cases
raise a flag with the tax administration, as negative liability is not a common occurrence
for firms other than exporters. The jump could potentially be large, particularly because
the government has limited pre-audit information available to it to select cases for audit
and negative tax liability is one very salient piece of such information.
Optimizing behavior in this setup implies that the firm would evade up to the point
that the marginal cost of evasion equals the tax rate g′ (si − sˆi;φ) = τ . Given the disconti-
nuity in evasion costs, the firm may end up at the zero-liability point if
(10)
γ′ (si − sˆi;φ) < τ for sˆi = ci + ; andαγ′ (si − sˆi;φ) > τ for sˆi = ci − ,
with  > 0.
Heterogeneity: Firms draw their productivities from the joint distribution f(φr, φe) on
the domain (φr, φr) × (φe, φe). Under regularity conditions similar to Spence-Mirrlees,
the smooth distribution of productivities translates into smooth distributions of real and
reported sales as long as α = 0. The jump in evasion costs (α > 1), however, will cause
bunching of firms at the zero-liability point.21 The bunching firms drawφ in the setφ ∈ Φz
where condition (10) binds: their optimal reported sales equal their deductible inputs
costs. The first testable prediction of the model with α > 1 therefore is
Prediction 1: The discontinuity in evasion costs will cause bunching of firms at, and to the right
of, the point zero in the reported tax liability distribution.
Now consider that the government extends the coverage of VAT from time t′ , making
a nontaxable intermediate used by all firms taxable. The experiment is akin to the Pak-
istani policy change of 1999, whereby energy—an input used by all manufacturers—was
brought into the tax net. Given that the tax paid on inputs is deductible, the change will
not distort the input mix used by firms. For pure mechanical reasons, however, ci will go
up and ψi will go down by the same amount. Figures X and XI trace the impact of the
change on two representative firms. The change will not affect the high-evasion-cost (low
φe) firm other than that its tax liability τ (sˆi − ci) will go down because of the mechanical
increase in ci (see Figure X). In contrast, the low-evasion-cost (high φe) firm will continue
to bunch at the zero-liability point if condition (10) still binds at the new level of ci. The
21Themodel presumes frictionless behavior. Butwith real-world considerations such as somediscreteness
in reported sales the bunching will not be concentrated exactly at the zero-liability point but will be spread
toward the right of it.
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firm will increase its reported sales sˆi by the same amount as the increase in ci (see Figure
XI).
Prediction 2: Making a hitherto untaxed input used by all firms taxable will cause the distribu-
tion of reported tax liability to shift leftwards. To the extent that evasion costs are of the form (9),
bunching at the zero-tax-liability point will persist even after the reform.
The leftward shift of the distribution results from the mechanical decrease in tax liability
of firms after the reform. The persistence of bunching, on the other hand, results from
the behavioral response, whereby firms report higher sales to avoid falling into the high
evasion cost region.
V.B Bunching at Zero Tax Liability
Figure XII tests the two prediction of the model. I plot (sˆi − ci) reported bymanufacturing
firms in their monthly returns in bins of 5,000 rupees, zooming in on the region around
zero. I drop observationswhere reported sales exactly equal taxable input costs i.e. sˆi = ci,
as almost all of them relate to inactive firms who report zero in all cells. Panel A of the
figure plots the distribution for the financial year 1998, showing sharp bunching of firms
just above the zero-liability point: the bin just above zero contains 14 times as many firms
as the one just below zero. Note that ci being taxable inputs costs does not include im-
portant inputs, most notably electricity and gas (which are still not taxable in 1998) and
labor (which is always nontaxable). The variable plotted in the figure (sˆi − ci) hence bears
no relevance to the real production side of the firm. Its value always lies somewhere in
between the turnover and profits of the firm. Bunching in its distribution at the point zero
therefore cannot be explained by any real phenomenon such as market competition (zero
profits), liquidity constraints, or any feature of the production technology. Nor can it be
explained by transaction costs, as firms can costlessly carry forward the excess amount to
the next period. The taxable inputs acquired by a firm in a given month do not need to
match exactly with the taxable sales made by it in the period. The only plausible expla-
nation of the bunching therefore is that firms tend to remain in the positive-tax-liability
region to avoid attracting the attention of the tax authorities.
Panels B-D of the figure test the second prediction of the model. In 1999, electricity,
gas, and other energy inputs become taxable. Because of the mechanical increase in ci, the
distribution of (sˆi − ci) should shift leftwards, pushing many of the firms just above zero
into the negative liability region. And the distribution does shift leftwards: the 1999 distri-
bution is stochastically (first-order) dominated by the 1998 distribution at all points. Yet,
extremely few firms fall into the negative-liability region, and the bunching persists—in
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fact it becomes even sharper. Figure A.IV tests the robustness of these findings. It repli-
cates Figure XII, reducing the bin width to just PKR 1000 (US$ 20 in 1998-99). The results
are very comparable. The evidence thus confirms that withholding affects the reporting
choices of firms substantively and could indeed be driving the self-enforcing impact doc-
umented in Table II.
V.C Taxable Inputs Response
The causal story linking the 1999 policy change to the rise in the reported sales ofmanufac-
turers goes like this. The deductible VAT of manufacturers goes up in 1999 as two of their
major inputs electricity and gas become taxable. The peculiar structure of evasion costs (9)
means that the manufacturers absorb some of the increased deduction instead of passing
it on one-for-one in the tax liability, thereby increasing their reported sales. Since in this
story it is the increase in VATpaid on inputs that drives the rise in sales, anotherway to test
it is by looking at how taxable inputs reported by manufacturers behave around this time.
I have already mentioned in section III.D that changes in taxable inputs conflate both the
mechanical and behavioral effects. But if the increase in taxable inputs (sum ofmechanical
and behavioral effect) nearly equals the increase in taxable sales (pure behavioral effect),
it will be another evidence that the withholding mechanism drives the self-enforcement
response documented in this paper.
Table A.V conducts this analysis. I replicate Table II but use taxable inputs as the out-
come variable in place of taxable sales. One difficulty with looking at this response is that
firms do not apportion their taxable inputs by how much of them are utilized in mak-
ing taxable sales (some manufacturers in the sample export part of their output). To get
around this problem, I drop firms who report any exports or nontaxable sales in any of
the periods included in the sample.22 The taxable sales response of firms in this restricted
sample is shown in Table A.VI. The results are indistinguishable from those in Table II,
confirming that the sample restriction does not create any selection concern. The results
are also strictly consistent with the causal story laid out above. The taxable inputs of man-
ufacturers rise substantially relative to importers after 1999. The increase is almost as large
as that in taxable sales (see the corresponding Table A.VI). Together, the two facts show
that the increased withholding of tax at the upstream stage does not reduce, one-for-one,
22Some of the firms classified as manufacturers export the goods produced by them. Throughout this
paper, I have focused on domestic taxable sales reported by firms as this variable captures the self-enforcing
impact of VAT more cleanly. To be consistent with my earlier analysis, I restrict focus here to taxable inputs
utilized in making domestic taxable sales only, dropping manufacturers who report any exports in any of
the periods included in the estimation.
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the tax liability of downstream firms. In fact, firms absorb some of the increase by report-
ing higher sales. Tax evasion reduces and aggregate tax payment increases as a result—the
self-enforcement dividend of VAT.
VI Discussion and Conclusion
VI.A Effect on Government Revenue
How much additional revenue did the government receive from the self-enforcing action
of VAT? Table II documents that the expansion of VAT caused a large increase in the re-
ported sales of manufacturers. Section III.D shows theoretically that under the no-one-
sided evasion assumption an increase in sales reported at the manufacturing stage re-
sults in a one-for-one increase in VAT collected from up to and including that stage. We
can safely rule out one-sided evasion in this context as the upstream extension involves a
completely formal sector.23 The increase in revenue caused by the self-enforcement would
therefore be of a similar magnitude as the increase in taxable sales documented in Table II.
As I mention in section III.D, I cannot look directly at the firm-level revenue as an outcome
variable because it conflates the mechanical and behavioral effects. In this section, I look
at the aggregate VAT collected in Pakistan to get some sense of the additional revenue gen-
erated by the self-enforcement. Since manufacturers comprise a large (around 90%) part
of the tax base and the self-enforcement causes a large increase in their reported sales, the
effect must be visible in the aggregate revenue.
Table A.IX conducts this analysis. The FBR report commodity-wise VAT collected in
the country in their annual reports. These reports are publicly available, and I access the
2001-02 to 2004-05 reports to construct this table. The first two columns of the table show
that the VAT revenue grew sharply between 1999 and 2002, in particular in 1999.24 Some
of this growth results from the mechanical expansion of the base, the rest from the be-
havioral responses (self-enforcement). To provide a clean lower-bound on the behavioral
component of the growth, columns (3)-(4) exclude the revenue from the energy sector.
The commodities included in these columns remain taxable throughout the sample pe-
riod, meaning that any growth in revenue would necessarily reflect the behavioral effect.
23Engaging in one-sided evasion in this context means that manufacturers forge their electricity and gas
bills to overclaimVATpaid on these inputs. This is extremely unlikely as these bills can easily be verified (the
electricity and gas suppliers are publicly-owned firms). For this reason, the purchases of energy reported
by manufacturers are likely to match exactly with the sales reported by the energy suppliers.
24The standard VAT rate changed during this period for two brief episodes (see Figure A.I). To make the
revenue comparable across years, I normalize it to a rate of 15% throughout the sample period.
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The numbers provide a lower bound because they do not take into account the VAT de-
ducted by manufacturers on their energy inputs. Columns (5) and (6) take into account
these deductions. Using data from the Pakistan Economic Survey, I compute the propor-
tion of energy used as an intermediate good by manufacturing firms.25 I then add that
proportion of revenue remitted by the energy sector to compute the aggregate revenue.
It is important to emphasize that these time-series aggregates are not directly compa-
rable to the results in Table II: they do not control for macro factors and may be more
sensitive to the performance of large firms (the results in Table II include firm fixed ef-
fects). Despite these caveats, the aggregate revenue growth is generally in line with the
firm-level sales growth documented in Table II. VAT revenues were almost stagnant but
grew sharply from 1999 as the energy sector came into the tax net. The results thus re-
inforce the conclusion that the government received a large enforcement dividend from
the expansion of VAT: the already-taxed sector remitted more revenue as their exposure
to VAT deepened (see columns 5-6 of the table, which are conceptually the closest to the
estimates in Table II).
VI.B Alternative Explanations
Given the event study research design, the principal alternative explanation of the self-
enforcement result documented above is a macro event that occurs in 1999 and increases
the profitability of manufacturing relative to imports. In the standard competitive setting,
a positive demand or supply shock of such a nature would cause an increase in the out-
put of manufacturers, hence explaining the observed response. Note, however, that such
a shock would also cause an increase in the entry of manufacturers relative to importers.
But we have seen in Figure VI that no relative change to the entry of manufacturers oc-
curred during the entire financial year of 1999, while their saleswere going up consistently.
The simultaneous increase in sales and stagnant entry cannot be explained by a coherent
real-side story, especially because the sales increased almost homogeneously across all in-
dustries, ruling out nonstandard markets (see Figure V). The only consistent explanation
of the five pieces of evidence presented in this paper—(1) a large sales response (Figure
IV); (2) no entry response (Figure VI); (3) parallel trends over large no-policy-change peri-
ods; (Figure IV and Table II) (4) homogeneity of the response across industries; (Figure V);
and (5) strong bunching at the zero-liability point and the subsequent shifting of the distri-
25Specifically, I use Table 14 of the Pakistan Economic Survey 2005-06 to compute this proportion for the
years 1997 to 2004. The survey shows that on average around 33% of electricity, 66% of gas, and 70% of other
petroleum products (including furnace oil) are used as input by manufacturing firms. The survey can be
accessed here.
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bution (Figure XII)—therefore is the self-enforcement response driven by the withholding
mechanism built into VAT.
VI.C Conclusion
Value-added tax has seen unparalleled growth in the past few decades. In large part, the
growth has been driven by the belief—held by both public finance academics and policy
practitioners—that VAT facilitates enforcement. This paper uses the staggered introduc-
tion of VAT in Pakistan to test if the tax creates significant enforcement spillovers and, if
yes, what underpins this process.
I present three primary findings. First, taxable sales reported by firms already in the
tax net go up as their exposure to VAT expands. This effect is strong, precisely estimated,
and robust. Second, the tax has a much weaker effect on informality. Firms operating
outside the tax net remain insensitive to the deepening penetration of VAT around them.
The vast majority of them continue to operate informally even when increasingly more
of their inputs become taxable and their transactions with formal firms begin leaving pa-
per trails. Third, the large increase in taxable sales of VAT-paying firms is driven by the
withholding mechanism built into VAT, whereby the tax on inputs of a firm is collected at
the upstream stage. When more inputs of these firms become taxable, they report higher
sales, absorbing thereby the additional input tax rather than passing it one-for-one into
the tax liability. Because of the higher downstream sales, the government receives more
revenue in aggregate.
I compare the indirect enforcement effects of VATwith those of a large-scale tax survey
which tightens enforcement in the country directly using traditional measures. I find that
the survey has a very strong effect on informality. Firms who were insensitive to expand-
ing VAT around them entered the tax net almost immediately after the announcement of
the survey. The effect is so large that it can be read directly from charts showing the entry
of new firms over time. Once in, these firms were not more likely to quit the formal sector,
illustrating large, persistent, and long-term gains from a one-time enforcement effort.
One overarching theme in the recent public finance literature is that third-party infor-
mation is the key to tax compliance. The information enables the government to cross-
match tax reports on a large scale, raising the costs of evasion to such an extent that it is
no longer feasible. One issue with this line of research is that key empirical results estab-
lishing the efficacy of third-party information have been derived from contexts where it
is intricately intertwined with withholding. For example, wage payment by an employer
creates third-party reporting but tax is also withheld at the time of payment. This paper
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disentangles the two effects, showing that third-party information in itself is insufficient
to secure tax compliance, at least in developing economies. It in fact requires credible en-
forcement threat from the government through traditional measures to be effective (see
Carrillo et al., 2017 for similar result in another context). In this sense, traditional enforce-
ment and self-enforcement mechanisms built into modern broad-based taxes are neces-
sary complements and need to be deployed together in optimal policy.
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Figure I: Development of VAT in Pakistan – Number of Firms
A: All Firms B: Manufacturers
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Notes: The figure illustrates the introduction and growth of VAT in Pakistan by tracking the stock of firms
in the tax net between 1992 and 2008. It plots the number of firms who file their monthly VAT return
at least once in the quarter indicated on the horizontal axis. Year t on the horizontal axis denotes the
beginning of the financial year and therefore indicates the July-September quarter. Active firm is defined
as a firmwho reports nonzero activity in at least one of the cells in the return. Please see Appendix A for
the classification of firms into manufacturers and other categories.
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Figure II: Development of VAT in Pakistan – Entry of New Firms
A: All Firms B: Manufacturers
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Notes: The figure illustrates the introduction and growth of VAT in Pakistan by tracking the entry of new
firms into the tax net between 1992 and 2008. It plots the number of firms who file their first VAT return
in the quarter indicated on the horizontal axis. Year t on the horizontal axis denotes the beginning of the
financial year and therefore indicates the July-September quarter. Active firm is defined as a firm who
reports nonzero activity in at least one of the cells in the return. The difference between All Firms and
Active Firms represents “Nil Filers”—the inactive firms who report zero in all cells of the return. Please
see Appendix A for the classification of firms into manufacturers and other categories.
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Figure III: Development of VAT in Pakistan – Volume of Transactions
A: All Firms B: Manufacturers
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Notes: The figure illustrates the introduction and growth of VAT in Pakistan by tracking the volume of
transactions covered by the tax between 1992 and 2008. It plots the aggregate value of taxable sales and
taxable input costs reported by firms in the quarter indicated on the horizontal axis. Year t on the hori-
zontal axis denotes the beginning of the financial year and therefore indicates the July-September quarter.
Vertical dashed lines in the figure demarcate four important event during the period: the extension of
VAT to importer (1999); distributor and retailers (1998); energy sector (1999); and services (2000). Please
see Appendix A for the classification of firms into manufacturers and other categories.
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Figure IV: Taxable Sales Response
A: Evolution of Taxable Sales
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B: Difference-in-Differences Coefficient
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Notes: The figure compares the evolution of taxable sales reported bymanufacturers and importers between
July 1997 and June 2004. To construct Panel A, I regress the log of taxable sales on the full set of firm and
period fixed effects, dropping the dummy for July 1997. I plot the coefficients on the time dummies of these
regressions, run separately for the two groups of firms. The marker for each period, accordingly, approxim-
ates the average within-firm sales growth relative to July 1997 for the corresponding group of firms. Year t
on the horizontal axis indicates the month July of the year. Panel B plots the difference-in-differences ana-
logue of Panel A. Vertical dashed lines in the figure demarcate three important event during the period: the
extension of VAT to distributor and retailers (1998); energy sector (1999); and services (2000). The last event
is almost contemporaneous with the enforcement survey, which was announced by the end of May 2000.
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Figure V: Taxable Sales Response By Industry
A:Manuf × Post Coefficient B:Manuf × 1998 Coefficient
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C: Placebo Coefficient
−
2
−
1
0
.
48
1
2
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Industry
Notes: The figure breaks down the taxable sales response reported in Table II by industry. I estimate equa-
tion (4) restricting the sample to firms of one industry only. Panel A plots theManuf × Post coefficient
and 95% confidence interval around it from these regressions, comparing it against the baseline coeffi-
cient of 0.48 (see column (1) of the table). Panel B andC replicates the exercise, showing theManuf×1998
and placebo coefficients respectively. The placebo regressions are run on the period 2004-2010, defining
2006 and after as the post period. The industry classifications used here comes from the 2-digit aggrega-
tion scheme of the HS Code. The scheme along with the description of the industries is shown in Table
A.I.
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Figure VI: Participation Response
A: Registration B: Difference-in-Differences
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C: Entry D: Difference-in-Differences
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E: Real Entry F: Difference-in-Differences
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Notes: The figure illustrates the effects of the increasing exposure to VAT and tax survey on firms’ entry
into the formal sector. The LHS panels show the numbers of firms who register (Panel A), file their first
return (Panel B), and file their first positive-activity return (Panel C) in the month indicated on the hori-
zontal axis. The RHS panels plot the corresponding difference-in-differences analogue of the two series.
Year t on the horizontal axis indicates the month July of the year. The vertical dashed lines demarcate
the start of the financial years 1999 and 2000. VAT was extended to the energy sector in 1999 and to the
services sector in 2000; the tax survey was announced on May 24, 2000.
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Figure VII: Weekly Registration of New Firms (April to December 2000)
A: Manufacturers Vs. Importers
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Notes: The figure explores if the large influx of manufacturing firms into the formal sector around July
2000 was caused by the extension of VAT to services or by the enforcement survey. It plots the number
of new firms who register in the given week, zooming in on the period between the 1st of April and the
1st of December 2000. Panel A compares manufacturers to importers and Panel B to service providers.
Vertical lines in the plots denote four important dates during this period: the government announces the
tax survey on May 24 and the extension of VAT to services on June 17; the extension takes effect on July
1; and the traders end their resistance to the survey on August 21.
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Figure VIII: Firm Size By Entry Period
A: Annual Turnover by Entry Period
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B: Proportion Above Exemption Cutoff by Entry Period
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Notes: The figure investigates if firms who came into the formal sector in response to the increasing
exposure to VAT and enforcement survey were any different from the other firms. Panel A plots the first-
year turnover of firms by their entry period. The first-year here is defined as the tax year immediately
succeeding the one in which a firm files it first VAT return. For example, if a firm files its first return
in August 2000, its first-year turnover is the aggregate value of its sales in the tax year 2001-02. While
doing this exercise, I drop firms whose first-year turnover exceeds PKR 1 billion. Panel B of the figure
depicts the proportion of firms whose first-year turnover is above the exemption cutoff. Note that the
exemption cutoff applies only to manufacturers. I use the same cutoff for importers. Vertical lines in the
plots denote important events during this period: VATwas extended to the energy sector in July 1999 and
to the services sector in July 2000; and the enforcement survey commences from the end of May 2000.
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Figure IX: Exit Probability By Entry Period
A: Exit Before 2010
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Notes: The figure explores if firmswho came into the formal sector in response to the increasing exposure
to VAT and tax survey were any different from the other firms. It plots the proportion of firms who exit
before the given cutoff date by their entry month. The cutoff date is the 1st of July 2010 for Panel A and
the 1st of July 2008 for Panel B. Vertical lines in the plots denote important events during this period: VAT
was extended to the energy sector in July 1999 and to the services sector in July 2000; and the enforcement
survey commences from the end of May 2000.
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Figure X: Effect of Increased Withholding on a High-Evasion-Cost Firm
A: Before the Reform
g′(si − sˆi)
0 (si − sˆi)sˆi = ci
τ
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∗
B: After the Reform
g′(si − sˆi)
0 (si − sˆi)sˆi = ci
τ
sˆi
∗
Notes: What happens when more inputs of a firm become taxable? This figure explores the behavior
of a high-evasion-cost firm to such a reform. The plots show marginal evasion costs faced by the firm
as a function of the amount evaded. At the origin, reported sales equal true sales and the evasion is
zero. Evasion increases as we move toward right. At the point denoted by the long dashed vertical line,
reported sales equal taxable inputs costs of the firm, and as a consequence its tax liability becomes zero.
Marginal evasion costs jump at the point, as the tax administration is more likely to select firms who
report negative liability for audit. When more inputs of the firm become taxable, the zero-liability point
shifts to the left (long dashed vertical line in Panel B). Note that the change has no effect on the firm as
its optimal sales choice was already to the left of the new zero-liability point. But the taxable liability
reported by the firms τ (sˆi − ci)will shrink as ci is higher now.
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Figure XI: Effect of Increased Withholding on a Low-Evasion-Cost Firm
A: Before the Reform
g′(si − sˆi)
0 (si − sˆi)sˆi∗ = ci
τ
B: After the Reform
g′(si − sˆi)
0 (si − sˆi)sˆi∗ = ci
τ
Notes: What happens when more inputs of a firm become taxable? This figure explores the behavior
of a low-evasion-cost firm to such a reform. The plots show marginal evasion costs faced by the firm
as a function of the amount evaded. At the origin, reported sales equal true sales and the evasion is
zero. Evasion increases as we move toward right. At the point denoted by the long dashed vertical line,
reported sales equal taxable inputs costs of the firm, and as a consequence its tax liability becomes zero.
Marginal evasion costs jump at the point, as the tax administration is more likely to select firms who
report negative liability for audit. When more inputs of the firm become taxable, the zero-liability point
shifts to the left (long dashed vertical line in Panel B). After the reform, the firm increases its reported sales
such that the new sˆ∗i equals the increased ci. The increase in reported sales means that the government
collects more revenue in aggregate (input plus output) from the firm.
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Figure XII: Bunching at Zero Tax Liability
A: Frequency Distribution (1998) B: Frequency Distribution (1999)
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C: Frequency Distribution (1998 Vs. 1999) D: CDF (1998 Vs. 1999)
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Notes: The figure explores if the discontinuity in evasion costs at the zero-liability point induces firms
to bunch towards the right of the point. Panel A-C plot the distribution of sˆi − ci in bins of 5,000 rupees.
Vertical dashed line denote the point where reported taxable sales equal reported taxable input costs and
the tax liability becomes zero. The tax liability is negative to the left of this point. Panels A and B show the
distribution for 1998 and 1999, the years immediately before and after energy inputs such as electricity
and gas were made taxable. Panel C compares the two distributions, displaying the leftwards shift of
the 1999 distribution. Panel D shows the leftwards shift formally. It plots the corresponding Cumulative
Distribution Functions, illustrating that the 1999 distribution is stochastically (first-order) dominated by
the 1998 distribution at all points.
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Table I: Summary Statistics
Manufacturers Importers Others
1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A: Complete Panel
# Observations 133,877 203,773 228,293 38,053 121,848 141,377 6,945 149,004 197,410
Reported Sales:
Mean 6.367 6.016 7.848 2.181 2.000 2.557 3.374 1.675 2.138
Median 0.476 0.441 0.547 0.828 0.550 0.596 0.926 0.159 0.194
75th Percentile 2.854 2.030 2.295 2.045 1.597 1.811 2.722 0.752 0.894
90th Percentile 13.726 10.042 11.074 4.735 4.033 4.937 7.741 2.615 3.112
99th Percentile 88.986 88.184 111.449 22.620 22.503 30.761 35.807 27.183 28.269
B: Balanced Panel 1
# Observations 64,667 65,448 65,250 9,195 9,703 9,706 2,756 2,953 2,941
Reported Sales:
Mean 8.465 11.373 17.329 3.181 4.477 5.045 3.798 4.086 5.049
Median 0.750 0.991 1.380 1.282 1.511 1.495 1.141 1.406 1.596
75th Percentile 4.386 4.776 6.677 3.196 4.040 4.499 3.378 3.913 4.191
90th Percentile 20.062 21.149 33.057 7.502 9.482 11.782 9.391 9.822 9.428
99th Percentile 119.017 172.919 235.177 28.720 49.657 58.463 36.746 43.379 63.315
C: Balanced Panel 2
# Observations 24,972 24,972 24,972 1,908 1,908 1,908 396 396 396
Reported Sales:
Mean 12.297 18.631 27.032 3.543 5.936 6.151 7.638 9.191 9.276
Median 1.078 1.483 2.078 1.458 1.645 1.728 2.458 3.942 4.117
75th Percentile 7.081 8.945 12.981 3.450 4.536 5.843 6.185 10.515 9.875
90th Percentile 27.331 37.499 54.312 8.608 12.621 16.377 25.478 29.774 20.520
99th Percentile 174.985 276.431 346.271 31.315 85.784 66.379 52.628 52.879 68.634
Notes: The table reports the descriptive statistics of the twomain variables used in the empirical analysis. I report the
number of observations and five moments of the reported taxable sales distribution at three different points in time.
I show the statistics separately for manufacturers, importers, and all other firms excluding exporters. The Balanced
Panel 1 sample in Panel B contains the firms who file VAT return at least once in every quarter during the period
1997-2003. These firms remain in the sample throughout the period but may not file the return every tax period. In
distinction, the Balanced Panel 2 sample in Panel C has a more stringent criterion, including only those firms who
file VAT return in every month during the period 1997-2003.
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Table II: Taxable Sales Response
All Firms Balanced Panel 1 Balanced Panel 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: 1997-2003
Manuf × Post 0.481 0.498 0.440 0.438 0.434 0.416
(0.016) (0.022) (0.029) (0.036) (0.068) (0.081)
Manuf × 1998 0.024 -0.004 -0.035
(0.018) (0.027) (0.057)
Observations 1,288,552 1,288,552 429,510 429,510 153,873 153,873
B: 2004-2010
Manuf × Post 0.013 0.029 0.037
(0.015) (0.018) (0.055)
Observations 1,293,097 742,846 200,414
Notes: The table report the results from the difference-in-differencesmodel (4). The standard
errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the firm level. The sample includes
both manufacturers and importers. Balanced Panel 1 sample in columns (3)-(4) contains only
the firms who file their VAT return at least once in every quarter included in the sample
period. In distinction, the Balanced Panel 2 sample includes a firm only if it files its VAT
return every tax period included in the sample. The results in Panel B are from a placebo
specification exactly similar to one in Panel A but estimated on the 2004-2010 period. The
Post dummy indicates a tax period (month) after June 1999 in Panel A and June 2006 in
Panel B.
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Table III: Taxable Sales Response Over Time
Year ≤ 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Manuf × Post 0.249 0.233 0.332 0.395 0.450 0.489 0.490
(0.014) 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017
Manuf × 2000 0.206
(0.013)
Manuf × 2001 0.198
(0.011)
Manuf × 2002 0.195
(0.011)
Manuf × 2003 0.190
(0.011)
Manuf × 2004 0.008
(0.012)
Manuf × 2005 0.030
(0.019)
Observations 360,669 569,495 799,627 1,042,084 1,288,552 1,516,133 1,673,981
Notes: The table investigates the dynamics of the taxable sales response. I partition theManuf × Post
dummy in model (4) into two dummies: Manuf ×Post andManuf ×Y ear. I estimate the model on the
complete panel sample, restricting it to the period 1997-Y ear, where Y ear is the financial year indicated
in the title of the column. TheManuf×Y ear dummy captures the additional sales response in the given
financial year. The standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the firm level. The
sample includes both manufacturers and importers. The Post dummy indicates a tax period (month)
after June 1999.
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Table IV: Taxable Sales Response after Dropping Large Firms
All Firms ≤ 99th Percentile ≤95th Percentile ≤90th Percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: 1997-2003
Manuf × Post 0.440 0.438 0.434 0.437 0.444 0.440 0.479 0.493
(0.029) (0.036) (0.029) (0.035) (0.030) (0.036) (0.031) (0.038)
Manuf × 1998 -0.004 0.005 -0.008 0.025
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029)
Observations 429,510 429,510 422,783 422,783 396,086 396,086 365,003 365,003
B: 2004-2010
Manuf × Post 0.029 0.021 -0.006 -0.037
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
Observations 742,846 729,695 683,412 628,291
Notes: The table illustrates that the results in Table II are not driven by large firms. I estimate the difference-in-
differences model (4) after dropping firms larger than the cutoff indicated in the heading of each column. The model is
estimated on the Balanced Panel 1 sample, so that the composition of the sample stays fixed throughout the period of
estimation. I define large firm on the basis of predetermined firm characteristics, taking average annual sales reported
in the financial years 1997 and 1998 as the measure of its size. The standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been
clustered at the firm level. The results in Panel B are from a placebo specification exactly similar to one in Panel A but
estimated on the 2004-2010 period. The Post dummy indicates a tax period (month) after June 1999 in Panel A and
June 2006 in Panel B.
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Table V: Participation Response
Year Registration Entry Real Entry
# Obs. # Counter. % Difference # Obs. # Counter. % Difference # Obs. # Counter. % Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1999 5,349 3,382 0.582 3,541 3,478 0.018 3,489 3,417 0.021
(0.061) (0.030) (0.032)
2000 5,993 3,277 0.829 7,714 3,157 1.443 6,549 1,772 2.696
(0.061) (0.035) (0.061)
2001 3,728 2,454 0.519 2,780 2,321 0.198 2,717 1,725 0.575
(0.077) (0.048) (0.059)
2002 2,563 2,516 0.019 2,404 2,420 -0.007 2,207 1,994 0.107
(0.081) (0.044) (0.054)
2003 2,252 2,294 -0.018 2,251 2,220 0.014 2,059 1,853 0.111
(0.083) (0.048) (0.056)
2004 2,556 2,941 -0.131 2,525 2,625 -0.038 2,337 1,908 0.225
(0.070) (0.041) (0.052)
Notes: Does the tightening of enforcement caused indirectly by the expansion of VAT and directly by the tax survey force informal firms
into the formal sector? The table investigates this. Column (2) reports the number of manufacturing firms who register in the financial
year indicated in the first column. Column (3) reports the corresponding numbers for importers, whom I take as the counterfactual for
manufacturers (see Figure VI). The difference between the two numbers as a percentage of the counterfactual is reported in Column (3). I
calculate the standard error on the difference using a nonparametric bootstrap procedure. I first create a vector of errors as the difference
between the monthly registration of manufacturers and importers. I then create a bootstrapped registration series for manufacturers
by adding scrambled errors to the registration series of importers. Finally, I calculate the difference between the bootstrapped and
counterfactual series for each financial year. The standard error is the average percentage difference between the two series. I draw 100
bootstrapped series for this purpose. Columns (4)-(10) are created analogously, only difference being that I investigate the outcomes
entry and real entry in place of registration. Entry here is defined as the month a firm files its first return and real entry as the month the
firm files its first positive-activity return.
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A Online Appendix
A.1 Definition of Variables
(i) Taxable Sales The value of taxable goods and services supplied by a firm in a
given tax period excluding exports.
(ii) Taxable Inputs Costs. The value of taxable intermediates purchased by a firm
in the given tax period whether imported or acquired locally.
(iii) Manufacturer. A firm whose principal business activity is the manufacture
of goods. Manufacturing is the process whereby a firm converts inputs into a
distinct article capable of being put to use differently than inputs and includes
any process incidental or ancillary to it.
(iv) Importer. A firm whose principal business activity is the import and subse-
quent sales of goods. An importers sells the goods in the same state they were
imported.
(v) Distributor. Distributors, dealers, and wholesalers form the middle stages of
the supply chain. They purchase goods from manufacturers or importers in
bulk and supply them down the chain.
(vi) Industry. The Pakistani tax administration uses 4-digit Harmonized Commod-
ity Description and Coding System (HS code) to classify firms into industry.
The code, used by customs administrations throughout the world, divides all
goods and services into 99 chapters (the first two digits in the code) and 21 sec-
tions. The sections broadly correspond tomajor industries in the country. I take
the section a firm falls in as its industry. Table A.I shows the sections, HS code,
and description of these industries.
(vii) TaxOffice. The variable indicates the tax officewhose jurisdiction a firm’s head
office falls in. These tax offices are located in nine major cities of the country.
The tax office fixed effects, accordingly, capture all time-invariant characteristics
of both the tax office and city in which a firm carries out its business activity.
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Figure A.I: Standard Tax Rate
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Notes: The figure shows the standard VAT rate in Pakistan from 1992 to 2008. The rate largely
stayed at 15%. It was increased to 18% in July 1996, reduced to 12.5% in April 1997, and was
brought back to 15% in December 1998.
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Figure A.II: Firm Size By Registration Period
A: Annual Turnover by Registration Period
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B: Proportion Above Exemption Cutoff by Registration Period
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Notes: The figure investigates if firms who came into the formal sector in response to to the increasing
exposure to VAT and enforcement survey were any different from the other firms. It replicates the analy-
sis in Figure VIII but takes the period a firm registers in as its period of entry. Panel A plots the first-year
turnover of firms by their entry period. The first-year here is defined as the tax year immediately succeed-
ing the one inwhich a firmfiles it first VAT return. For example, if a firmfiles it first return inAugust 2000,
its first-year turnover is the aggregate value of its sales in the tax year 2001-02. While doing this exercise,
I drop firms whose first-year turnover exceeds PKR 1 billion. Panel B of the figure depicts the proportion
of firms whose first-year turnover is above the exemption cutoff. Note that the exemption cutoff applies
only to manufacturers. I use the same cutoff for importers. Vertical lines in the plots denote important
events during this period: VAT was extended to the energy sector in July 1999 and to the services sector
in July 2000; and the enforcement survey commences from the end of May 2000.
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Figure A.III: Exit Probability By Registration Period
A: Exit Before 2010
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Notes: The figure investigates if firms who came into the formal sector in response to to the increasing
exposure toVATand enforcement surveywere anydifferent from the other firms. It replicates the analysis
in Figure IX but takes the period a firm registers in as its period of entry. It plots the proportion of firms
who exit before the given cutoff date by their entry month. The cutoff date is the 1st of July 2010 for
Panel A and the 1st of July 2008 for Panel B. Vertical lines in the plots denote important events during this
period: VAT was extended to the energy sector in July 1999 and to the services sector in July 2000; and
the enforcement survey commences from the end of May 2000.
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Figure A.IV: Bunching at Zero Tax Liability
A: Frequency Distribution (1998) B: Frequency Distribution (1999)
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C: Frequency Distribution (1998 Vs. 1999) D: CDF (1998 Vs. 1999)
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Notes: The figure explores if the discontinuity in evasion costs at the zero-liability point induces firms
to bunch towards the right of the point. Panel A-C plot the distribution of sˆi − ci in bins of 1,000 rupees.
Vertical dashed line denote the point where reported taxable sales equal reported taxable input costs and
the tax liability becomes zero. The tax liability is negative to the left of this point. Panels A and B show the
distribution for 1998 and 1999, the years immediately before and after energy inputs such as electricity
and gas were made taxable. Panel C compares the two distributions, displaying the leftwards shift of
the 1999 distribution. Panel D shows the leftwards shift formally. It plots the corresponding Cumulative
Distribution Functions, illustrating that the 1999 distribution is stochastically (first-order) dominated by
the 1998 distribution at all points.
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Table A.I: Industry Description
Industry Label HS Code Heading Industry Description
(1) (2) (3)
1 1600-2499 Food and Beverages
2 2800-3899 Chemicals
3 3900-4099 Plastics
4 4100-4399 Leather
5 4400-4699 Wood Products
6 4700-4999 Paper and Paperboard
7 5000-6399 Textile
8 6400-6799 Footwear
9 6800-7099 Cement and Cement Products
10 7100-7199 Jewelry
11 7200-8399 Metal and Metal Products
12 8400-8599 Machinery
13 8600-8999 Vehicles and Vehicle Parts
14 9000-9299 Medical or Surgical Instruments
15 9300-9399 Arms and Ammunitions
16 9400-9699 Furniture
17 9700-9899 Restaurants
Notes: The table displays the HS code and description of the industry variable used in Figure V. The HS
code used by the Pakistani tax administration divides all goods and services into 99 chapters (the first two
digits in the code) and 21 sections. The sections broadly correspond to major industries in the country.
I drop firms belonging to four industries (sections) from the sample where VAT on manufacturing was
extended after 1996. First column reports the Industry Label used in the horizontal axis of Figure V. The
second column shows the range of HS codes included in the industry and the third column the industry
description. Note that arms and ammunitions is largely a cottage industry in Pakistan, wherein firearms
are manufactured by artisans of small firms.
58
Table A.II: Characteristics of Industries with Below-Average Response
Average Firm Low Initial Input to Output Input ≤ 0.05* Voluntary Sales
Size Capital Ratio Output Registered Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Below-Average -0.319 0.076 -0.413 0.097 -0.130
(0.028) (0.019) (0.052) (0.013) (0.019)
Below-Average × Post 0.019
(0.040)
Observations 244,005 244,005 91,067 244,005 244,005 143,052
Notes: The table explores the characteristics of firms in four industries where taxable sales response is weaker than the
average (see Figure V). These industries are labeled 5 (Wood Products), 8 (Footwear), 15 (Arms and Ammunition), and 16
(Furniture) in the diagram. Column (1)-(5) report the results from the regression of outcome variable mentioned at the top
of the column on a dummy indicating that the firms belongs to one of these four industries. Initial Capital is the amount
of capital reported by a firm at the time of its registration, a proxy for firm size. For the definition of other variables please
see Appendix A. The final column reports the results from the difference-in-differences model (4) estimated on the period
1997-1998 only, with the latter year defined as the Post period. The idea behind the column is to show that taxable sales
reported by firms in the four industries behaved similar to the other firms in the pre-99 period.
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Table A.III: Taxable Sales Response after Dropping Large Firms
All Firms ≤ 99th Percentile ≤95th Percentile ≤90th Percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: 1997-2003
Manuf × Post 0.440 0.438 0.436 0.433 0.449 0.452 0.457 0.462
(0.029) (0.036) (0.029) (0.036) (0.030) (0.037) (0.032) (0.039)
Manuf × 1998 -0.004 -0.004 0.006 0.010
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030)
Observations 429,510 429,510 422,790 422,790 396,466 396,466 365,996 365,996
B: 2004-2010
Manuf × Post 0.029 0.018 -0.016 -0.041
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Observations 742,846 730,279 686,161 633,237
Notes: The table illustrates that the results in Table II are not driven by large firms. I estimate the difference-in-
differences model (4) after dropping firms larger than the cutoff indicated in the heading of each column. The
model is estimated on the Balanced Panel 1 sample, so that the composition of the sample stays fixed throughout
the period of estimation. I define large firm on the basis of predetermined firm characteristics, taking annual
sales reported in the financial year 1997 as the measure of its size. The standard errors are in parenthesis, which
have been clustered at the firm level. The results in Panel B are from a placebo specification exactly similar to one
in Panel A but estimated on the 2004-2010 period. The Post dummy indicates a tax period (month) after June
1999 in Panel A and June 2006 in Panel B.
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Table A.IV: Taxable Sales Response
All Firms Balanced Panel 1 Balanced Panel 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: 1997-2003
Manuf × Post 0.476 0.479 0.389 0.396 0.436 0.435
(0.019) (0.026) (0.037) (0.044) (0.093) (0.101)
Manuf × 1998 0.005 0.013 -0.002
(0.020) (0.033) (0.059)
Observations 782,044 782,044 244,776 244,776 75,844 75,844
B: 2004-2010
Manuf × Post -0.004 -0.018 -0.084
(0.023) (0.027) (0.117)
Observations 563,457 324,566 73,792
Notes: The table report the results from the difference-in-differences model (4). The
standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the firm level. Here
I drop the firms from the sample who combine more than one production stages, for
examplemanufacturing anddistribution. The sample includes bothmanufacturers and
importers. Balanced Panel 1 sample in columns (3)-(4) contains only the firms who
file their VAT return at least once in every quarter included in the sample period. In
distinction, the Balanced Panel 2 sample includes a firm only if it files its VAT return
every tax period included in the sample. The results in Panel B are from a placebo
specification exactly similar to one in Panel A but estimated on the 2004-2010 period.
The Post dummy indicates a tax period (month) after June 1999 in Panel A and June
2006 in Panel B.
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Table A.V: Taxable Inputs Response
All Firms Balanced Panel 1 Balanced Panel 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: 1997-2003
Manuf × Post 0.367 0.411 0.454 0.501 0.479 0.501
(0.020) (0.027) (0.032) (0.039) (0.067) (0.083)
Manuf × 1998 0.065 0.086 0.043
(0.021) (0.031) (0.064)
Observations 772,879 772,879 205,584 205,584 65,458 65,458
B: 2004-2010
Manuf × Post -0.104 -0.099 -0.041
(0.019) (0.022) (0.069)
Observations 792,859 368,017 89,093
Notes: The table report the results from the difference-in-differences model (4). The
outcome variable here is the log of taxable input costs instead of the log of taxable sales
as in Table II. As I am unable to apportion inputs used in taxable sales and exports, I
drop from the sample all firms who export even once in the sample period. The stan-
dard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the firm level. The sample
includes bothmanufacturers and importers. Balanced Panel 1 sample in columns (3)-(4)
contains only the firmswho file their VAT return at least once in every quarter included
in the sample period. In distinction, the Balanced Panel 2 sample includes a firm only
if it files its VAT return every tax period included in the sample. The results in Panel
B are from a placebo specification exactly similar to one in Panel A estimated on the
2004-2010 period. The Post dummy indicates a period after June 1999 in Panel A and
June 2006 in Panel B.
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Table A.VI: Taxable Sales Response
All Firms Balanced Panel 1 Balanced Panel 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: 1997-2003
Manuf × Post 0.492 0.510 0.465 0.473 0.425 0.408
(0.018) (0.024) (0.033) (0.039) (0.072) (0.089)
Manuf × 1998 0.026 0.015 -0.034
(0.019) (0.030) (0.064)
Observations 999,111 999,111 263,221 263,221 80,874 80,874
B: 2004-2010
Manuf × Post -0.029 -0.029 0.008
(0.018) (0.022) (0.060)
Observations 823,540 392,719 92,459
Notes: The table report the results from the difference-in-differences model (4). The
sample here is the same as in the last table, wherein I report the corresponding taxable
inputs response. The standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at
the firm level. The sample includes both manufacturers and importers. Balanced Panel
1 sample in columns (3)-(4) contains only the firms who file their VAT return at least
once in every quarter included in the sample period. In distinction, the Balanced Panel
2 sample includes a firm only if it files its VAT return every tax period included in the
sample. The results in Panel B are from a placebo specification exactly similar to one in
Panel A estimated on the 2004-2010 period. The Post dummy indicates a period after
June 1999 in Panel A and June 2006 in Panel B. Single-activity firms only
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Table A.VII: Taxable Sales Response
All Firms Balanced Panel 1 Balanced Panel 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: 1997-2003
Manuf × Post 0.440 0.459 0.420 0.421 0.274 0.208
(0.030) (0.044) (0.059) (0.070) (0.150) (0.173)
Manuf × 1998 0.025 0.002 -0.122
(0.036) (0.054) (0.124)
Observations 1,288,552 1,288,552 429,510 429,510 153,873 153,873
B: 2004-2010
Manuf × Post -0.032 -0.007 0.124
(0.020) (0.025) (0.063)
Observations 1,293,097 742,846 200,414
Notes: The table report the results from the difference-in-differences model (4). Here I in-
clude Industry, Period, and Industry × Period fixed effects into the model, allowing firms
in each industry to have their own trend over time. The standard errors are in parenthesis,
which have been clustered at the firm level. The sample includes both manufacturers and
importers. Balanced Panel 1 sample in columns (3)-(4) contains only the firms who file their
VAT return at least once in every quarter included in the sample period. In distinction, the
Balanced Panel 2 sample includes a firm only if it files its VAT return every tax period in-
cluded in the sample. The results in Panel B are from a placebo specification exactly similar
to one in Panel A estimated on the 2004-2010 period. The Post dummy indicates a period
after June 1999 in Panel A and June 2006 in Panel B.
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Table A.VIII: Taxable Sales Response
All Firms Balanced Panel 1 Balanced Panel 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: 1997-2003
Manuf × Post 0.504 0.522 0.485 0.477 0.505 0.459
(0.020) (0.028) (0.034) (0.041) (0.073) (0.087)
Manuf × 1998 0.027 -0.013 -0.087
(0.022) (0.031) (0.060)
Observations 1,288,552 1,288,552 429,510 429,510 153,873 153,873
B: 2004-2010
Manuf × Post -0.036 -0.021 0.060
(0.017) (0.020) (0.058)
Observations 1,293,097 742,846 200,414
Notes: The table report the results from the difference-in-differences model (4). Here I in-
clude Tax Office, Period, and Tax Office × Period fixed effects into the model, allowing firms
in each region to have their own trend over time. The standard errors are in parenthesis,
which have been clustered at the firm level. The sample includes both manufacturers and
importers. Balanced Panel 1 sample in columns (3)-(4) contains only the firms who file their
VAT return at least once in every quarter included in the sample period. In distinction, the
Balanced Panel 2 sample includes a firm only if it files its VAT return every tax period in-
cluded in the sample. The results in Panel B are from a placebo specification exactly similar
to one in Panel A estimated on the 2004-2010 period. The Post dummy indicates a period
after June 1999 in Panel A and June 2006 in Panel B.
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Table A.IX: VAT Revenue (1997-2003)
Year Including Energy Excluding Energy Including Energy as an Intermediate Good
PKR Mill. Percent Increase PKR Mill. Percent Increase PKR Mill. Percent Increase
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1997 29,085 - 28,106 - 28,601 -
1998 30,735 5.67 29,484 4.90 30,116 5.29
1999 49,666 61.60 36,795 24.80 43,633 44.88
2000 65,011 30.89 43,976 19.52 54,758 25.50
2001 73,782 13.49 49,502 12.57 61,709 12.69
2002 89,534 21.35 54,859 10.82 71,230 15.43
2003 93,292 4.20 55,886 1.87 73,950 3.82
Notes: The table reports the domestic VAT collected in Pakistan from 1997 to 2003. I compile these data from Table 33 of the
2001-02 and Tables 32 of the 2003-04 and 2004-05 FBR Year Books. These books are available online here. Columns
(2), (4), and (6) report aggregate non-import VAT revenue in PKR millions. The standard VAT rate changed during
the sample period for two brief episodes (see Figure A.I). To make the revenue comparable across years, I normalize
the standard rate to 15% for the entire period. More specifically, I multiply the 1997 revenue by a factor 0.15/0.125
and the 1998 revenue by a factor of 0.15/0.142, where 0.142 is the weighted average of the standard VAT rate in 1998.
Columns (3), (5), and (7) show the corresponding year-on-year increase from the previous year. Columns (2) and (3) do
not exclude any commodity. Columns (4) and (5), on the other hand, exclude three commodities of the energy sector:
electricity, gas, and POLproducts. Columns (6) and (7) include 33%of revenue from electricity, 66% of revenue fromgas,
and 70% of revenue from POL products. These proportions represent the fraction of electricity, gas, and POL products
used in manufacturing as intermediate goods. These proportions have been calculated from the data in the Pakistan
Economic Survey 2005-06 (Table 14). The survey can be accessed here.
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